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Doubtful Promotion

Brass Tacks

By Charles S. Maier

Konrad Adenauer's announcement of last week that he would seek the Federal Presidency came as a surprise, both to those on the "inside" as well as to more casual observers. Up to the day of his announcement the redoubtable Chancellor had given no indication that he would not lead his party in active politics and in the campaign in 1961.

The Adenauer switch is especially significant for it comes at a time when external crisis adds to the import of internal transition. As has been so often the case with Germany, developments in foreign affairs will strongly condition domestic politics.

If Adenauer is elected to the Presidency--and it seems certain that he will be, for the President is elected by a Convention in which his Christian Democratic Union will have a majority--there may also be some significant, though unwritten constitutional changes in the Bonn Republic. Adenauer has said that he intends to keep a firm grip on foreign affairs, an implication that he will be more active than is the present cultivated professor of classics who holds the office. And the Bonn "Constitution" gives the President a vague and as yet undefined voice in external matters: "The Federal President shall represent the Federation in matters concerning international law. He shall conclude treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation. . . ." When Adenauer becomes President he may attempt to expand this power beyond its present ceremonial limits. If he can live long enough, he might transform the Presidency into more than a formal role, and alter the Bonn Republic to a system which lies between the British and the American.

As for the sucessor to Dr. Adenauer, it seems most likely that Ludwig Erhard, burly Minister of Economics, will inherit the mantle, although some have speculated on Finance Minister Franz Etzel's chances. In the years since Adenauer took office there have been several contenders for the succession: Schaeffer, the original Finance Minister was the first, but too unsavory a connection with past scandals descredited him. The present foreign minister Heinrich von Brento seems unable to generate enthusiasm; Franz-Josef Strauss, Defense Minister, not composer, was also in the running for a time.

The present heir fairly apparent is a great advocate of free enterprise within certain limits set by the state, such as anti-cartel policy. He popularized his Social-Market Economy, a synthesis of welfare coverage and a high degree of freedom for German businesses. Erhard's stocky form and cigar seem almost symbolic of the sucess which rewarded West German reconstruction efforts.

Besides the transfer of parliamentary leadership and a possible functional change in the role of the Presidency, a general political limbering may occur. Since 1949 "the Old Man" has dominated the German scene, and has ruled with moderation and rigidity. He has been a staunch internationalist and has stressed the need for a firm Franco-German reconciliation. For better or worse this policy has borne fruit; France and Germany, linked institutionally in the Common Market, maintain also a tight policy alliance within NATO, and today appear as the chief exponents of rigidity vis-a-vis Anglo-American "flexibility."

Adenauer's rigidity may be criticized; his rule of the CDU is at points open to censure, but when the account is balanced one must grant that Germany's return to national respectability is due primrily to his work as Chancellor of occupied, and now sovereign Germany.

Yet his removal from the politicking sphere maye be salutary at this point, for other leaders will be able to emerge from out of his shadow. With Adenauer in the Presidential office, perhaps the Socialists can gain some strength as an opposition party. To a large extent Russian policy will determine German politics, and in light of Soviet intransigence on free elections for unification, the Socialists are hard pressed to find responsible alternatives to Adenauer's strong Western commitments. An effective opposition is important, however, in teaching the arts of representative government.

The CDU may also become less of a Catholic party. By unwritten concordat the Chancellor and President are not both Catholic or both Protestant; a Catholic Adenauer will have to appoint a Protestant Chancellor. By deciding to move to the Presidency this summer, Adenauer has limited his party to Protestant choices for Chancellor; he is now better able to control his succession than if he should have to resign as Chancellor when old age inevitably overtakes him. A Protestant Chancellor may also remove what some Germans have regarded as an unhealthy Catholic bias in the party.

All these general transitions assume that the situation in the Republic will remain generally as now--that the summer's conferences will bring at best a slow start toward German unification. It would be Adenauer's supreme triumph if he could crown his work by supervising as President the unification of Germany, but this prize will probably elude him.

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