Discoverer and Secrecy

It is reassuring to know that the United States can send a satellite, albeit a diminutive sphere in comparison to the Russian planet, around the sun. It is not so heartening to read about the snafu which resulted in "losing" the mute and more mundane "Discoverer I," the first polar satellite.

J. Allen Hynek, Director of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, placed the blame for the loss principally on the Air Force's failure to notify the observatory--headquarters for the moonwatch project--in time to alert the Moonwatch teams to search for the satellite visually. Other sources placed the blame for the secrecy that had surrounded the launching on "unfortunate interservice rivalries."

But whatever the reason for the secrecy, the inability to discover Discoverer I shows that the armed forces learned the lesson of Vanguard I fiasco not wisely but too well. Having been cautioned, after that widely publicized failure, that it should not have trumpeted so loudly before the firings, the Air Force veiled its two subsequent firings (the Atlas launched in December and the current Discoverer) in secrecy until their success was announced.

What the Air Force in particular, and the Armed Forces in general, should recognize is that publicity can consist of a relatively simple alert in advance--such as those available for the satellites and lunar probes which have been launched by the National Agency for Space and Aeronautics as part of the IGY. Attempts to conceal the entire operation may prevent public embarrassment in case of failure, but they can also diminish scientific value in case of success.

It also seems unwise to push secrecy to the point where it becomes a fetish. Concealment in any part of the Armed Forces serves as precedent for general secrecy; and while national security requires that much military information be secret, zealous concealment of satellite attempts (a field, incidentally, in which we do not seem to be able to give much succor to the Soviets) fosters an atmosphere inimical to the public knowledge needed to run a democracy. If the Armed Forces stop treating much of their experimentation as mere propaganda they might avoid both premature fanfares and damaging secrecy.