Pipeline to Paris

With all the elaborate ceremony that characterizes such occasions under the Fifth Republic, President Charles de Gaulle this week inaugurates the first pipeline to send French oil flowing from the Sahara to an Algerian port on the Mediterranean. If the Algerian rebels do not almost immediately destroy enough of the pipeline to make it inoperative, it will be an exercise of remarkable restraint on their part. For after five years of fighting, the French Army is in no position to protect a pipeline, nor even to undertake less imposing tasks of policing.

Sahara oil, inextricably tied up with peace in Algeria, is more than an investment of half a billion dollars for France--it is the keystone of the policy of grandeur that de Gaulle is attempting to follow. With this oil, France is at last independent of the distasteful Nasser and his Suez Canal; without it, France is no better, in fact a little worse, than the rest of Western Europe. De Gaulle's desire for the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Sahara to France both inspires his sincere effort to end the Algerian war and gives a special shape to his formula for peace.

This formula was ratified overwhelmingly last week in the National Assembly. It is based on the principle of "self-determination" and would give Algerian voters a choice of three alternatives. The first is integration, complete union with France, as Jacques Soustelle and other leaders of the extreme Right demand. The second is "secession," complete independence, as the rebel leaders have asked, but France would maintain control over the natural resources of the Sahara. The third alternative, and one on which de Gaulle is obviously counting heavily, is a compromise which would give Algeria not independence but a large measure of local autonomy under universal suffrage.

De Gaulle's pet plan, which is reminiscent of the arrangement between Puerto Rico and the United States, seems a wise and a moderate one. On the one hand, Algeria is disastrously unready for complete independence. It has no real economy of its own and no responsible leaders to give it political direction. On the other hand all but a few extremists in France have realized that the war must end and that in order to maintain its vital interests France must give up some interests that are less important. De Gaulle's solution, in short, is one that should appeal to the moderate majority on both sides.

But unfortunately de Gaulle is not dealing with moderate, reasonable people. The majority in France is apathetic and inert, and the majority in Algeria is untutored and incapable of expressing its wishes. So the President must attempt to put his case across on the one side to the F.L.N. rebels and on the other to the Army and the colons of Algiers. The F.L.N. is irrevocably dedicated to complete independence and has carried on a campaign of extermination against its moderate Moslem enemies both in Algeria and in metropolitan France. Soldiers like Massu and extremists like Delbecque are reluctant to give up without a victory a war they have waged for more than five years, and, although he has "betrayed" them now, de Gaulle is in this element's debt for putting him in power last May 13.

Thus de Gaulle's promising formula is still little more than a change de language, as L'Express put it a month ago. The parliamentary vote of confidence last week reflected more expediency than conviction; the Deputies knew that the President could and would dissolve the Chamber if he met defeat. The so-called "Gaullists," right up to Premier Michel Debre, generally prefer continued strong prosecution of the war and eventual "integration."

On the Algerian side, F.L.N. leader Ferhat Abbas has accepted the principle of "self-determination" but not de Gaulle's insistence on retention of the Sahara resources. Debre has indicated that France will negotiate with Abbas only on military terms of the cease-fire and not on the political terms of the referendum. The two sides remain far apart, but their differences are not unnegotiable, if talks can be carried on without pressure and with the aid of intelligent mediation.

Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, who led his country to independence within the French Community, would be the ideal mediator, but can be little more than a tool of the F.L.N., because the armed Algerians in F.L.N. camps in Tunisia happen to outnumber the entire Tunisian army. Conversely, the French Army, though it is good for little else, is admirably equipped for the intimidation and control of metropolitan France.

The extremists of both sides, therefore, have the military power in their hands, and, for now, any moderating influence in the crisis must come from them. Unless the extremists relent, or unless more reasonable forces can somehow wrest control from them, the bright promise of de Gaulle's peace plan will come to nothing. If France is to get Sahara oil, it must have a peaceful friendly Algeria; this is something it may never obtain.