Berlin Again

In a surprise announcement last week the Soviets again thrust Berlin into the forefront of the news. Urging that four-power occupation rule over the city of nearly four millions be ended, the Russians announced that they were turning control in their sector over to the East German government. Immediately, the West tensed and affirmed their determination to abide by the present occupation rule, which was provided for in the Potsdam agreement.

The Soviet maneuver seems designed primarily to force Western recognition of Otto Grotewohl's East German regime. Last winter Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that any negotiations over German unification must be made with East Germany directly; the present demand appears to be another similarly motivated tactic. So far, the German Democratic Republic has applied no pressure comparable to that of the Soviets during the blockade of 1948-49. But if the East Germans decide to bear down on West Berlin--by closing the corridors or stopping free interchange between city sectors--then the allied authorities in Berlin may be forced to negotiate with the Eastern zone.

In the Soviet sector of Berlin there is still much rubble; the 1.5 million East Berliners have a lower standard of living and walk among propaganda posters which repeat monotonously: Down with NATO, Adenauer is a pawn of fascist generals, and the like. The combined British, French, and U.S. half of the city enjoys more wealth and a large degree of municipal self-government. In addition, the Federal Republic has moved many of its offices from Bonn to West Berlin to demonstrate its connection with the city.

Recognition of the German Democratic Republic, it seems clear, would not help attain our objectives. The Communist regime in Germany is one of the most despicable of the satellite governments and is maintained chiefly by the presence of about twenty Soviet army divisions. The riots of June 17, 1953 revealed the regime's unpopularity, and while the material condition of the East Germans has improved since then, it is doubtful whether the government could survive without Russian support. In return, the German Democratic Republic has been the most consistent echoer of Moscow policy, especially with its vicious outbursts against revisionism.

Yet a mere refusal to deal with East Germany offers no solution to the Berlin or German problem. Ideally a free, Western-oriented Germany would be the most desirable successor to the present divisions. A unified Germany, though, merely because of strategic consideration, would never be permitted by the Russians. Furthermore, Soviet prestige is staked on the East German experiment as much as Western prestige is staked on a free Berlin. On the other hand, an Eastern-aligned Germany would be unacceptable to the 50 million West Germans as well as to the other NATO allies.

Because of the presently stalemated fragility, the proposals to form a united neutral Germany, and perhaps a neutral Central European bloc, have been voiced with increasing frequency. These proposals are predicated on what appears to be the reasonable belief that although Russia would like to communize Europe, allied strength will dissuade her from taking any step which would result in annihilation. The United States nuclear arsenal would guarantee the buffer region.

But several problems arise in connection with any plan for a neutralized Central Europe, which argue strongly against it. As an English commentator has pointed out, the Russians might probably foment internal disorder and then seize desired cities to foil "fascist plots." Hitler's precedent with the Sudeten Germans forms an instructive precedent which shows how effective this tactic can be. Could weakened NATO forces contest successive nibbles and would we dare to use massive retaliation against a small Russian move? In any case, a buffer zone plan seems to provide little more stability than exists at present. Demilitarizing Central Europe might very well leave us with the awesome decisions that the Russians now face in deciding any political or military move against the West.

Although the present situation is far from relaxing, it is not intolerable. The territorial status quo has been preserved for a decade, and meanwhile an apparently healthy integration of the German Federal Republic into Western Europe is now taking place. This may prove to be one of the most significant transitions of the era. Any Central European bloc would interrupt this integration. The Common Market, the Euratom plan and any further developments would be curtailed. The unification of Germany ought not to tear away the Federal Republic formally from the West until the cultural and economic ties have thoroughly permeated.

Reunification and the final settlement of the Berlin problem probably must attend the settlement of other issues. If disarmament could be agreed upon, then many of the hurdles in the path of reunification could be removed. Until that time, partial demilitarization of Central Europe as envisaged in the Eden and Rapacki plans may be a healthy temporary move. It would not leave Germany a neutral unit helpless before Soviet subversion, but it might lower the tension to some degree and stimulate further disarmament.

The continued division of Germany is one of the products of the cold war, not one of the causes. Unfortunately, Germany's unification under acceptable conditions still appears as a vision.