Bureaucrats Beware

Independent federal regulatory commissions are preparing to face an investigation of their wide influence. The proliferation of such agencies as the SEC and FCC is an important phase in the growth of the national bureaucracy. The proposed inquiry by Representative Moulder's subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce should lead to better means of holding these agencies responsible to Congress, as well as to exposure of abuses of their powers.

These agencies exercise a great deal of relatively unchecked and only vaguely defined power affecting almost every facet of national economic life. The Federal Trades Commission, through its power to insure "fair methods of competition," exercises vital control over any firm engaging in commerce. The Federal Communications Commission, through its licensing requirements makes radio communication a privilege rather than a right. Altogether twenty-nine such agencies exist.

Their broad power to put legislation into effect gives them both legislative and judicial, as well as purely administrative functions. The Interstate Commerce Commisssion, for instance, is to see that railroad rates are "reasonable," while giving a "fair return" to the industry and "adequate" service to the customer. Its rulings eventually affect the price of every product shipped by rail and the cost of travel. It investigates violations of these regulations and its quasi-judicial powers to extend to adjudication of disputes arising under them. Thus the ICC serves as legislator, prosecuting attorney, and court, hardly a position in keeping with the traditional balance of powers.

The independent regulatory commission is, of course, a necessary manifestation of a political philosophy which assigns the federal government a positive role controlling economic and social forces. Congress has neither time nor technical competence to provide precise legislation covering the complexities of modern industrialism. It must give broad discretionary power to the administrators of its general measures.

The investigatory committee, however, should look for two dangers inherent in such independence as the commissions enjoy. The natural tendency of any agency is to increase its power beyond that intended by the statutes creating it, especially when those statutes are vague. The investigation should determine how well the commissions have stuck to their original functions and should lead to a more exact definition of their position in the enforcement of legislation.

Closely related to this is the ostensible purpose of the investigation, to find out whether commissions are actually carrying out the laws under their jurisdiction or are distorting legislative intent. Again the subcommittee should try to suggest some permanent means of insuring Congress-commission cooperation, as well as correct specific abuses. A possible solution to the problem of quasi-judicial powers is the independent trade court serving all regulatory agencies, suggested by the American Bar Association.

The question arises as to whether the investigation, occuring mainly in 1958, will become a Democratic campaign weapon. Evidence of a "businessman's administration" should be exposed, but broader purposes should not be submerged by mere electioneering. The subcommittee's greatest service would be to assure public control over bodies exercising such power in the national economy.