Presidential Disability

Aside from the segregation conflict, the most important Constitutional controversy now in progress involves the question of determining Presidential disability. President Eisenhower has demonstrated as intense an interest in the question as he has shown for almost any other issue of his second term.

His concern is crystallized in a proposed Constitutional amendment now before a House Judiciary sub-committee, headed by Rep. Emmanuel Celler. The amendment is put forward as an alternative to a joint resolution reported out by Celler's group last summer. The major differences between the two proposals involve the form of the measure--constitutional amendment or statute--and the body to determine the VicePresident's right to declare himself acting President--the Cabinet or the Congress.

There is, however, a greater division than this over the question. This split exists between the do-somethings, who wish to legislate the controversy out of existence before the event, and the do-nothings, whose faith in the ingenuity of the Founding Fathers covers not only what these gentlemn put into th Constitution, but what they left out. This second group is headed by Sam Rayburn, whose intention to kill any disability legislation may make the present conflict somewhat academic.

Rayburn backs up his negativism with the examples of Presidents Garfield and Wilson, who teetered back and forth between life and death for quite some time without the United States' dissolving. The modern pressures for rapid action by the Chief Executive make this argument unrealistic.

The President's measure, while it recognizes the importance of the controversy, is deficient in its remedies. Eisenhower's feeling that a constitutional discussion must be resolved by an amendment indicates a certain unnecessary contempt for the stature of Congressional legislation. In the present case, immediate legislation is not only more necessary than the protracted amendment process, but is also sufficient on legal grounds to meet a crisis should it occur.

The real deficiency in the Administration's plan involves its giving the Cabinet the power to pass on the Vice-President's right to accede temporarily or otherwise. As the Cabinet, not in any sense an elective group, has historically shown either deep allegiance to the President or equally profound disagreement with him, it is not the proper body to make such a decision.

The Celler resolution, in providing that the Vice-President must undergo confrontation by Congress before taking office, avoids the major pitfall of the Eisenhower substitute. Congress, as the body most directly responsible to the people, should have this decisive function. With the impeachment power already vested in Congress by the Constitution, the question of reinstating the President, once he is again physically and mentally competent, solves itself. The Administration must realize the defects of its proposal in order to present a united front againt Mr. Rayburn and gain much needed legislation.