The Fourth Republic

The Fourth French Republic, established in 1945 and garnished with elaborate provisions intended to eliminate the pitfalls of the Third Republic (1875-1940), has slid full-circle back to its inefficient predecessor. As a result of consistent reversion to pre-war practices, the French government, with its inability to create positive policies, has been unable to contribute effectively to Western collaboration, and poses a danger of serious impotency in the future.

There are many causes behind the government's constant frustration and failure to produce effective policy. Basically, the difficulty arises from the absence of any potential majority in the electorate which necessitates an artificial coalition majority in parliament. These coalitions, with their tenuous alliances and uneasy combinations, tend to be unstable. Dissention often arises within the coalition, each group adhering rigidly to its principles, unwilling to sacrifice its standards to the cause of effective government. Consequently, major problems are shelved for fear of upsetting the coalition's balance, and vital programs collect dust for lack of Cabinet cohesion.

Another Third Republic tradition, the rapid succession of cabinets, has also been an unwanted feature of the Fourth Republic. Cabinets give up too soon, taking any parliamentary defeat as a rejection of their whole administration, and resign before the Assembly actually votes no-confidence. Also, votes of no-confidence and censure have again developed into common weapons, and are not the exceptional measures they were intended to be. Cabinets have used the "informal vote of confidence," i.e., a threat of resignation in the absence of parliamentary approval on policy, as a frequent weapon rather than an occasional defense.

The founders of the Fourth Republic tried to separate policies from personalities, one of the faults of the Third Republic. Their aim, unfortunately, has been unfulfilled. Potential Prime Ministers have resumed the practice of choosing a Cabinet before their election, and have asked for general debate on the ministers prior to the vote of the Prime Minister. This practice binds program with personality, and often guillotines potentially good policies.

The Council of the Republic (upper house) has become a rival and obstructionist force against the Government. Primarily conservative, it offers nothing but delay and confusion to the Cabinet and the Assembly. Intended to be a "second thoughts" chamber, the Council has developed into a stumbling block for effective Government action.

Government coalitions make for "collective irresponsibility." There is always the minister's excuse that the necessity of compromise relieves him from responsibility for his action. The Cabinet has become a second Bourse for horse-trading and political barter, resulting not in effective compromise, but rather in mutual frustration and procrastination on important issues that might rupture the uneasy alliance of groups within the Government.

These failures and faults not only hinder France's solution of her own vital internal problems, but prevent her from participating positively in the international complex. An example of inefficiency was the constant failure to establish a consistent and coherent policy for Indo-China, resulting in prolonged equivocations and indecision.

France's political ills can be cured only by conscientious and determined constitutional and practical reform. M. Mollet announced last Thursday that he was now ready to attempt reform. His action must not be too little, although it may already be too late. The electoral system should be overhauled to prevent traditional sectional and ideological differences from paralyzing efficiency. The Committee on Constitutional Reform has suggested that the Opposition must propose an acceptable alternate program before the Government is obliged to resign. This would be highly desirable, assuming the Opposition is united enough to formulate common alternative programs.

Finally, the bases of political compromise among members of the Government must be re-established. Parlimentarians, ministers, and party leaders will have to yield their positions in the interests of positive policy-making. Principle must bow to practice, if any sort of effective action is to be accomplished.

The roots of French political weakness are deep. Localism, distrust of authority, political cynicism, and historical issues (like clerical education) are imbedded in the French mind. These attitudes will not change until structural revisions in the Republic force them to. French politics must cease to be the national sport, and must command the serious and constructive attention of parliamentarians and electorate alike.