Storm Over Suez: A New Proposal

As the United Nations Security Council begins discussing the threats to peace resulting from Egypt's nationalization of Suez, few can deny that the international organization is facing one of the most critical tests of its history. Anyone who would predict a satisfactory outcome at present would be foolish indeed, but a bold stroke of Western diplomacy, combined with some reasonableness from the ruler of the Nile, could yet save the situation.

As far as Western diplomacy to date is concerned, Mr. Dulles deserves praise for preventing his own blunders from pushing the West over the brink of both the canal and war. When Britain and France were threatening military action, Dulles stepped in with a strong restraining hand and cogent pleas for negotiation and flexibility and international control. Thankfully, Dulles realized what had to be done, and he did it.

Our praise is admittedly faint, however, for Dulles' action immediately preceding nationalization shaped Nasser's reaction. It is true, of course, that discussions with Egypt about the Aswan Dam had been long and tedious, and it is also undoubtedly true that Nasser was trying to bluff the West with a nonexistent Soviet offer. But how the West could have withdrawn its offer only two days after Nasser had publicly accepted it, and at the same time have expected no startling results, is difficult to understand. Washington obviously thought a public insult by the deeply distrusted West would result in the Colonel's returning humbly to ask for money. But the prize had been dangled in front of Nasser for so long that Mr. Dulles was asking for the worst by pulling it away after the bargaining game had become open to the public.

A Slap in the Face

The sad part about the Aswan Dam offer was that it was ever permitted to turn into a game. Here the Nasser regime certainly deserves blame--especially for putting out false rumors of a mythical Soviet offer. But it was Washington which decided, after Egypt's purchase of Czech arms, that Nasser would have to go. To topple his regime, Nasser's major plan for economic development was insultingly rejected, and Washington waited. There is strength in this case, and Dulles' biggest gamble may yet pay off. The West must not forget that it is not playing with a dictator of the South American variety. Nasser is a man who has the astounding and frightening ability to ride all the forces which are loose in the area: Nasser has fought colonialism, he has fought Israel, and he has fought the old regime. More than anyone else, Nasser has come to symbolize--both to the West and to his own people--adolescent nationalism itself. He may be irresponsible, but this country must and better ways of dealing with irresponsibility than by slapping it in the face.

The West might take note of another fact: since Nasser has taken over the canal completely, responsibility seems to have become the motto of the day. Since even a minor accident by overworked canal pilots could now produce a major world crisis, Egypt is doing its best to run the canal safely, and speedily. There have even been reports that Nasser has permitted two Israeli chartered ships to pass through--an astounding fact, if true. And on the face of it, Nasser has said he would be willing, as an act of sovereignty, to renegotiate the Convention of 1888, which provided for the unhindered passage of ships of all nations for all time. In short, since the initial act of nationalization, Nasser has run the canal as well as could be expected--especially considering the West's own withdrawal of pilots and its threat of boycott. For these reasons, the plan for the so-called Users' Association seems to have been premature and harmful to a conciliatory atmosphere. It may someday be necessary, but until Nasser has proven himself incapable or unwilling to keep the canal open, even he should be considered innocent--at least in this regard--until proven otherwise.

A Principle to Support

Even if Nasser can continue to run the canal efficiently, the principle of international control should not be put aside. The right to nationalize, of course, is legally accepted. But a question which seems inherent in Western statements is whether nationalization of a waterway so important to so many nations should ever come under the unquestioned rule of one nation. Egypt's blockade of Israeli ships long before nationalization was ever considered proves that nations will not refrain from using territorial control over a waterway as a tool of national policy. When Dulles stated that the canal should be isolated from national politics, he stated a principle which should be firmly supported.

The firmest support possible would be a proposal from the United States to put all similar international waterways under a special type of international control. Outright ownership and operation would remain with the nation involved--Egypt in the case of Suez, the United States in Panama, Germany in the Kiel Canal--but an independent body, similar to this country's Interstate Commerce Commission, would be chartered under the United Nations to fix maximum rates and minimum standards of operation. This body would act also as a board of arbitration for any complaints--with the General Assembly as the final appeal group.

If the United States would make such a proposal, it would shake the world. it might well cut right through the ice which is now clogging the canal issue, and effect a settlement which should benefit all concerned. It would give Nasser an easy way to accept a form of international control. It would answer legitimate Western fears about Egypt's intentions. And it would take the next move away from the Soviet Union, which now seems to be the biggest and most important question-mark in Suez, and indeed, the whole Middle East.