Icelandic Impasse

Iceland's current internal disorders create a situation which distorts the significance of that small island nation far out of proportion to its size. The Icelandic Parliament's recent resolution, to be voted on in June, would compel NATO forces to withdraw from the country. More than forcing retreat from a vitally strategic position, the resolution, if passed, would constitute a serious and growing threat to NATO cohesion.

Although maintaining no military forces of its own, Iceland harbors one of the largest NATO air and missile bases containing several thousand NATO troops, hundreds of planes, and large-scale rocket installations. Lying midway between Moscow and New York on the Great Circle air route, the base at Keflavik would be a prime center of operations in the event of general war.

More serious, however, is the effect that the resolution would have on NATO morale. If Iceland were to show itself unwilling to do all in its power to maintain the West's defense posture, the implications would create dangerous misgivings among other member states which are currently straining themselves to contribute their maximum to NATO.

The Communist party precipitated the present situation in Iceland, playing upon native chords of nationalism, anti-militarism, and resentment at the economic effects of the Keflavik project. Icelanders have never relished maintaining troops in their land, but realizing their importance to NATO, they have agreed to support a large military encampment. Unfortunately, many Icelanders now feel that the base is causing them more discomfort than they bargained for. Troops and foreign construction workers occasionally become involved in incidents with the populace. Furthermore, the base hires thousands of native Icelanders, to whom it pays wages far higher than they could otherwise receive. This incentive draws workers away from native industries, especially fishing. The relatively exhorbitant wages contribute significantly to Iceland's serious inflation problem.

Capitalizing on these grievances, the Communists promise to oust the NATO forces. Two other parties, the Farmers and the Defense, feel that they must offer similar promises if they are to maintain their followers' support. The strongly pro-Western Independence Party consequently stands a chance of losing its parliamentary dominance in June if a leftist coalition succeeds, gaining support on its promises, in winning a majority of seats in the national election.

To prevent this upset, the United States must regain the confidence of the Icelandic people. Despite this country's concern, the Government must not wave its finger at Iceland, nor can it afford to threaten the nation with any "agonizing reappraisal." A State Department mission should be sent to Iceland to talk to political leaders and attempt to pacify their grievances. Troops and workers for the base could be taught to get along better with the people. NATO economists should be sent to Iceland to attempt to alleviate inflation and employment difficulties there. In addition, the United States should increase its "cultural warfare" operations in Iceland. Currently, Russian tactics of sending professors, books and movies to Iceland are reaping valuable results for the Soviets.

Any more forceful action by NATO could rebound unfavorably for the West. Certainly, the United States should not threaten or criticize Iceland prematurely. If, after the June election, leftist elements grow in strength, that will be the time to tighten the screws. Until then, an increase in cultural understanding and economic assistance in solving Iceland's internal problems are the best ways to prevent a still remote danger from becoming a reality.