A Multi-Lateraled Thing

While a fund for long-term U.S. aid supported in yesterday's editorial certainly implies a recognition that economic assistance must be a part of U.S. budgets for many years to come, it is hardly an adequate response to the demands of nations that are now under development. Not only is the proposed fund pitiably small; it also will be a venture undertaken by the United States on a bi-lateral basis. This principle of direct nation-to-nation assistance is now coming under increasing attack from recipient nations--an attack that deserves an adequate U.S. response.

The recent meeting of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, meeting in India, crystallized the sentiment among many under developed nations against bi-lateral aid. Fearing that direct aid often carried with it undesirable outside pressure on internal political affairs, the meeting adjourned agreeing that aid should be channeled instead through regional funds like the Colombo Plan, and through the United Nations itself. While the vagueness of the Asian nations' fears may obscure their legitimate complaints, the fact that the fears exist should lead the U.S. to increase its own allotment to regional and international funds.

The U.S., of course, already supports both the Colombo Plan and U.N. aid programs--but with microscopic financial contributions. Total U.S. allocations to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program last year amounted to only $13.8 million, and a small loan and grant program to the Colombo Plan started last year for the first time.

It would be foolish to argue that the U.S. should suddenly divert its total program of economic assistance into these two programs, no matter how much more acceptable the international programs are to have-not nations. The simple fact is that U.S. bi-lateral programs are generally working well, from India to Egypt. Even more important, the United Nations is just not prepared to absorb the tremendous administrative details which this country's bi-lateral aid programs have successfully handled.

Nevertheless, Asian nations such as Burma have not felt that direct U.S. aid is totally acceptable; it has sometimes, they say, imposed finished projects on resentful recipient nations. These nations justifiably feel they can participate more fully in planning and administering development projects if the aid comes to them from multi-lateral funds in which they themselves have an important voice. Ultimate U.S. control over its own funds is certainly not lost in multi-lateral aid programs: each year Congress shows its concern by inspecting closely the purposes, administration, and projects of the U.N. program just as it scrutinizes this country's direct aid program.

If the U.S. should continue its own aid program and at the same time respond to Asian demands for less direct aid, this country is seemingly faced with a dilemma. The dilemma can be resolved, however, by increasing present minute contributions to the U.N. and Colombo Plan and still retaining direct aid. The three paralled programs are not fundamentally at odds, and by partially satisfying Asian demands with increased international funds, the U.S. will gain more respect than it would by stubbornly emphasizing the principle of bi-lateral aid.