Long-Term Assistance

When President Eisenhower submits his foreign aid message to Congress within the next two weeks, he will have the chance to demonstrate once and for all that the United States is in the economic assistance business to stay. In the face of the annual Congressional demands to end the "give-away program," Mr. Dulles has already announced Administration plans to set aside a special fund of $100 million for long-term aid projects. Although the fund is minute as federal budgets go, it is a clear and welcome recognition that foreign economic aid must be an important continuing part of U.S. policy.

A strong argument for setting up even a limited long term fund is that an effective aid program demands advance planning based on financial guarantees that do not disappear with each fiscal year. Simply stated, few projects that are worth the money can be completed in the short space of twelve months, and those that can be finished are generally valuable as part of a broader, continuing program. Business and military enterprises have accepted this principle for years, and it is surprising that long-range financial planning has been absent this long from U.S. programs of economic aid.

The proposal for a fund for long-term aid is also important as the first concrete U.S. reaction to the promises made by the Soviet leaders in Africa and Asia. From Burma, India, and Afghanistan in the East, to Egypt and Liberia in the West, the Soviets have tried to sell the notion that they can best provide the capital and technicians and equipment needed by less developed nations. It is pointless to proclaim that Asians must beware Soviets bearing gifts, for the gifts look pretty delectable to free, but underveloped countries. The only answer is for the United States to pick up the challenge and demonstrate that dollars and sincerity can at least equal Soviet promises. Since this will be a long contest, Mr. Dulles' acceptance of the principle of long-term aid is especially reassuring.

It is a sad commentary on American politics, however, that appeals for long-term aid must be based upon Soviet actions. The need for U.S. aid would be just as compelling without any threat from the Soviet Union, and if under-developed nations get the idea that the U.S. is merely combatting Communism with dollars, they will take the dollars but reject the friendship that could accompany them.

It would be an even more dangerous error for Congress to suggest that nations receiving U.S. aid will eventually accept a foreign policy dictated from Washington. Already, arguments to this effect have boomerang: some Congressmen now cite unchanged neutralist foreign policies as proof that U.S. aid is valueless to this country. Mr. Dulles put the counter argument well: "Our interest will be fully served if other nations maintain their independence and strengthen their free institutions. We have no further aims than these."

Paradoxically, of course, the U.S. will win more friends by attempting to influence fewer people. And the same nations that are adamantly independent are themselves a strong deterrent to Communist expansion. By passing even a limited program of long-term aid, Washington can assure these under-developed nations that annual Congressional budgetary sniping will not kill the principle of long-term economic assistance.