Expert Notes Army's Lack Of Transport

Lack of proper transportation facilities is forcing the United States to substitute a policy of containment of conflicts by nuclear power rather than by manpower, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., associate director of the Defense Studies Program, contends in an article in the latest issue of Reporter magazine.

In his article, entitled "The Military Lessons of Suez," Katzenbach cites the inadequacies of the post-Korean War policy of "gradual deterrence," that is, the use of restrained force rather than nuclear bombs. This plan required that troops move with "flexibility" and speed to the area of conflict, which, the author maintains, neither the Marines nor a transport air fleet can do.

To transport an army airborne division would require the use of "practically the whole of the available Air Force transport capability," Katzenbach writes. The author also holds that it would take 1,800 man-weeks to convert enough aircraft to cargo planes in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, planes set aside by airline companies for military emergencies.

Sea Transport Inadequate

Sea transport is equally inadequate, Katzenbach continues, since 31 days would be needed to transport a combat-ready Marine division from the United States to the Middle East. To discuss 31-day movements is "almost meaningless," he quotes the Chief of Army Research and Development as saying.

In light of the transport problem, Katzenbach feels that the Pentagon will now be forced to use atomic weapons in place of troops to pursue its policy of "gradual deterrence." The author cites Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles's belief that conflicts must be localized through "carefully chosen atomic weapons." Katzenbach doubts, however, that atomic weapons could be used successfully in the Suez crisis, or in central Europe.