Aldrich Denies Defense Requests for Dismissal

Judge Bailey Aldrich '28 yesterday abruptly ended the three-month preliminary battle over the contempt of Congress indictments of Wendell H. Furry and Leon J. Kamin by denying defense motions to dismiss the charges. Furry and Kamin may now be tried.

Aldrich rejected defense arguments on Congressional committee authority and the constitutionality of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 as "premature," and ruled the indictments a sufficient basis for trial.

Arguing constitutional questions for the defense was Paul A. Freund, Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law, who was specially sworn in as an attorney for yesterday's hearings, Possibly a quarter of the small audience in Federal Court came from the Law School to hear him.

Kamin was present at the hearing, but Furry, who had a class committment, did not attend.

Aldrich's decision came much earlier than expected, and was apparently put in final form during a brief recess after government attorney James P. Lynch had concluded his arguments. No official text has yet been released.

The Judge must now fix a date for trial, and his decision is expected within a week. The trial will probably begin in September.

Leaves Issue Open

In his rejection of the defense's moves to dismiss, Aldrich did not rule out future constitutional disputes or discussions of the committee authority by which Furry and Kamin were questioned. Aldrich said, however, that, since the actual testimony was not before him, he could not judge on "a framework as bare as a motion to dismiss."

He accepted the government's minimum definition of a satisfactory indictment, and ruled that the government had met any sound objections by filing, at his order, a bill of particulars to enable the defense to prepare its case.

The definition Aldrich chose requires a full description of the charge against the defendant and "safeguards against further prosecution for the same act." He ruled that the testimony at the January 1954 hearings cannot, and need not be consulted to determine whether the definition has been met.

Freund Arguments

Freund had said, after questions from Aldrich, that the 1946 Act was only unconstitutional as applied in this particular case. Aldrich declared he could not judge how the law was applied in the present case until the full facts were before him.

Aldrich said the defense had referred improperly to the January of 1954 testimony to determine the questions McCarthy was investigating. "I cannot permit the defense to set up, and then knock down, a straw man," he stated.