Problems in Recognizing Red China

The diplomatic recognition of Communist China must, as yesterday's editorial pointed out, be considered only as a first step toward settlement, of the tensions in the Far East. Without a satisfactory solution of the problems of Formosa and the Chinese seat on the United Nations Security Council, recognition could accomplish little.

Officials in London and Washington often speak of the possibility of establishing a "two China Policy" by recognizing Mao Tse-tung as the legitimate ruler of the Chinese mainland." Actually, the United States is already supporting a two China policy, implicitly if not explicitly. By refusing to countenance any attempt on the part of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to regain the mainland, President Eisenhower and the State Department have recognized that, in the military sphere, the Communist government is in effective control of the territory.

In the diplomatic, sphere, however, the U.S. still maintains that Chiang Kai-shek is the legitimate ruler. To the Communists it appears, incorrect though this impression may be, that the U.S. is interfering in a Chinese civil war, by supporting and encouraging a hostile pretender one hundred miles of the Chinese coast. The leaders of Asian neutral opinion--Mr. Nehru of India, Prime Minister U Nu of Burma, and Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon--feel the same way, regarding the present U.S. policy as inconsistent and dangerous.

By recognizing Mao Tse-tung the United States would, in effect, reverse its two China policy in favor of a policy of one China, military and diplomatically consistent, and of a separate and independent Formosa. Yet mere recognition would provide no solution to the essential problem of American relations with Chiang Kai-shek. If the U.S. continues to recognize Chiang as the Nationalist ruler of China, she should not expect reciprocity from the Communists; for it is written into the Chinese Constitution that "the People's Republic will not recognize any nation which has diplomatic relations with the reactionary Kuomintang clique." It is clear from this clause and from frequent Peiping radio broadcasts that Mao Tse-tung has no intention of establishing diplomatic contact with any Western power which continues to recognize the Kuomintang on Formosa.

Plebiscite on Formosa

It is equally clear that the United States cannot afford, for military and strategic considerations, to allow the island of Formosa to fall into unfriendly hands. For this reason, the seventh fleet which now guards the Straits of Formosa cannot be withdrawn, since it is the West's only guarantee of the island's security. The most reasonable solution to this apparent dilemma would be one which the British have suggested--a U.N. administered plebiscite on Formosa, by which the seven million natives would be allowed to determine their own ruler for the first time since Japanese occupation. Although a plebiscite might require much time and patience to execute, it appears to be a necessary step if recognition is to pave the way for reciprocal relations with the Communist government.

If Chiang Kai-shek should win such a plebiscite--and there is evidence that he has achieved a high degree of popularity among the firmly anti-Communist Formosans the U.S. could continue to support his government. But this would be no longer the "reactionary warlord" whom the Asians now see in control of the island, but rather a legitimized, popularly elected leader of nine million free Asians. Such a victory would greatly enhance the prestige of both Chiang and of the United States.

The other alternative of such a plebiscite would be the election of a native Formosan leader, who would receive continued U.S. support and might be able to undertake domestic reforms which Chiang has been unable to tackle.

Security Council Seat for India

The second major problem in the larger settlement is the disposal of China's seat in the United Nations. It would be a waste of this vital Security Council representation to keep the seat in Nationalist hands, for the present holders clearly cannot speak for the people of China. On the other hand, granting of this seat to the Mao Tse-tung government would have adverse consequences. Communist China has been several times branded an aggressor, and it might weaken U.N. prestige to make this condemned power the only permanent Asian representative on the Security Council, and thus in a sense the leader of Asian opinion. Senator Hubert Humphrey has recommended that the Security Council seat should be given to India, when the U.N. Charter comes up for revision in late June, as a more realistic appraisal of representative Asian opinion.

Many Americans feel recognition of Communist China now might mean a loss of prestige for the U.S. Indeed it might, if recognition were granted as a one-sided gift, with nothing demanded in return. It must be made clear that the U.S. is not backing down or making a concession by extending recognition to Mao Tse-tung. It would be merely acknowledging the fact of Communist control of China, whether Americans like this factor not, in an effort to settle major areas of disagreements through negotiation rather than by armed conflict, the only alternative.