Soviet Experts Warns of Alarm; Party Control Termed Devisive

Pressures which forced Georgi Malenkov to relinquish his position as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in March 1953 probably caused the Russian prime minister's abrupt resignation, a Russian authority at the University said yesterday.

Fear of the forces of the then powerful Lavrenti Beria may have forced Malenkov to grant concessions to Nikita S. Khrushcev and make him the Party Secretary in 1952, the expert said, asking that his name and position here not be revealed. The Party leader controls the coterie of Party Secretaries, the central Party machinery, and the important appointment process. The professor speculated that in 1953, Malenkov, fearing Berla, may have taken his chance with Khrushchev, hoping to control some power in the Party machinery through contacts with his old friends. Apparently, however, Malenkov was outmaneuvered, and Krushchev was able to build up his power.

The shake-up was termed typical of a dictatorship because of the absence of a regular process of succession.

Elsewhere in the University, experts voiced differing opinions on the significance of the shift, and the importance of the Malenkov-Khruschev split over the role of heavy industry. All however, emphasized the strength of Khruschev rather than Bulganin, because of the former's control of the Party apparatus.

"There appears to have been a major difference of opinion over the amount of emphasis to put on consumer goods as opposed to heavy industry," William L. Langer '15, Director of the Russian Research Center, said. Malenkov, in resigning as Prime Minister accepted the signing as Prime Minister accepted the blame for the failure of agricultural production--Khrushchev has stood for emphasis on heavy industry.

"There were also obviously some strong personal differences," Langer said. He added that the ascension of Bulganin "may just be a means of avoiding the appearance of a major rift between Khrushchev and Malenkov. Someone has got to come out on top eventually in a system like Russia," he said, and then speculated that "Bulganin conceivably may be retired that "Bulganin conceivably may be retired for being overworked or for some other reason, and then Khrushchev may take over."

One faculty member asserted that the struggle for power is still unsettled. "As past Soviet history indicates, harmonious committee rule is incompatible with the monolithic party and state," Michael Malla, assistant professor History, and a Russian historian said. "But the struggle for power is by no means terminated."

"Neither Bulganin nor Khrushchev has assumed the position formerly occupied by Stalin. The struggle for power should continue until one man creates such a position for himself or until the struggle radically weakens or in some way alters the structure of power in Russia. Which of these alternatives is the more likely is at present impossible to tell."

"But this is more than just a struggle for power. Although it is hard to say definitely, the struggle for power seems to interlock with very real economic and social difficulties. If this is true, the crises might well be a reflection of weakness rather than strength," Malia added.

Like most of the professors contacted yesterday, Malia echoed the belief that the change will lead to a "tougher line" in Soviet foreign policy. "This switch in foreign policy might well arise from deep alarm at the prospect of German rearmament and American determination to keep Formose," he said.

In a broadcast over WGBH last night, Henry Shapior, United Press bureau manager in Moscow for 20 years and currently a Nieman Fellow at the College, warned against overrating the significance of the change.

"It should be noted that practically the same men that ran the country under Malenkov will continue running it," he said.

Pointing to Bulganin's past history as both a politician had head of the army, Shapire discounted any increased role for the army. 'He is a civilian, a party leader whose role has been to see to it that the army did not get out of control."

Raymond A. Bauer, research associate in the Russian Research Center, who spoke on the same program with Shapiro, hinted that Western diplomatic policy may have been out of step with the Russians,

"I'm rather inclined to think that again Western policy has followed one step behind the Soviet developments. It's quite possible that the re-arming of Germany was one of the factors which precipitated the switch toward a more militant policy on the part of the Sovets," Baner said. "It might have been that, say a year ago, we had opportunities for establishing this cold war in making it even cooler, but that we were reaching to Soviet policy of say a year and one-half previously.