Peasant Problems Cited as Stumbling Block for Russia

This is the second in a series of articles to be published by the CRIMSON on the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The real causes of Georgi Malenkov's downfall may never be actually learned, but Moscow developments indicate that the problem of the Russian peasantry--a dilemma which Soviet leaders have not been able to solve in 37 years--has once again become crucial.

This agricultural problem, a sore point for the Soviet Union even since the stormy days of 1917, was cited by Malenkov Tuesday as his reason for resigning as Soviet Prime Minister. "I ask you to release me from my post as First Chairman of the Council of Ministers in order to strengthen the Council of Ministers with people who are of more experience, because my lack of experience has had a negative influence on work in the economic sphere," he told the Supreme Soviet.

But over at 16 Dunster St., the home of Harvard's Russian Research Center, Malenkov's resignation was read rather skeptically. Men such as Alexander Eckstein, a research associate who specializes in the economy of the Communist world, saw the resignation more as a statement revealing the shortcomings of Russia's handling of the peasantry than as a cause for a shift in Soviet leadership.

"The differences in the economic views of Malenkov and Khruschev were so slight," Eckstein said, "that we have no real reason to suspect that it was an economic difference which caused the shift in power, and not a personality or foreign policy difference. However, from the resignation it is clear that the Soviet leaders have realized that their agricultural problem is a very serious one." Some Russian experts believe that Malenkov's resignation may have been a cover-up by the government for tits ineffective agricultural policy, with Malenkov serving as a scapegoat.

The Soviet rulers have had trouble with the pea santry from as early as 1917-21 when the new Bolshevik regime was in danger from a civil war. To secure the needed food for its soldiers, the authorities seized agricultural produce wherever it could. This, of course, caused the peasants to grumble and become alienated from the revolution. In 1921 peasants in Krondstadt and Tambov rose in rebellion, partly because of this arbitrary requisitioning.

Answering the peasants' complaints, the government introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 which was a concession to the peasants. This policy lasted until 1928, when Stalin began an intensive drive for collectivization of agriculture. Under this plan, two types of farms were set up, a collective farm called the kolkhoz, and a state farm of "grain factory," called the sovhas. The former is by far the more prevalent in Russia today, with about 98 percent of the farmers included.

Under the kolkhoz system, each peasant is part of a vast cooperative and participates in the output of the whole farm. In addition to working for the cooperative and receiving a salary based upon the amount of work he does for it, the peasant on the kolkhoz is allowed to have a small plot of land upon which he can grow his own products and raise livestock. He can sell this produce on the open market to supplement his income. The peasant, as might be expected, generally prefers to till his own plot rather than the cooperative's.

Government In Dilemma

This puts the government in a dilemma. If it tries to coerce the peasant to work more faithfully for the kolkhoz, the peasant may slow down his production. And if the government allows him complete freedom, the peasant will almost always work harder on his own plot.

Stalin faced this problem, and so has Malenkov, and so will Khrushchev. Malenkov, in the past two years, through his farm administrator, Khrushchev, brought about certain improvements on the kolkhozes, and the big question now is whether Khrushchev will continue them.

Russia is an industrial nation, having to compete with the great heavy industry potential of the West. Because of this, capital in the past was almost completely invested in heavy industry and not in light industry and agriculture. Malenkov raised slightly the percentage of money invested for consumer goods produced and imported; cut the farmers' taxes slightly; gave the farmers concessions on livestock; lowered the prices on consumer goods; and raised wages.

These slight changes had at least three motivations. They provided the peasant with added incentives to work harder on the kolkhoz; they provided Russia with a propaganda vehicle with which to shower the world; and they served to improve the morale of the peasantry. But, unfortunately for Malenkov, the actual production of consumer goods was far short of what the leaders had predicted, producing an economy in Russia which is almost inflationary.

The recent rearming of West Germany, as well as statements emanating from the Supreme Soviet, seem to point to a new drive to increase Russia's heavy industry. If this does happen, it probably means the Russian peasant will again have to suffer the burden of the increase in industry. The resignation, some experts believe, may have been the first step in the new program.

The Russian government has realized its problem, but it has not found any effective solution yet. The peasant, always in love with his own land, and not very interested in Marxist theories, presents a genuine stumbling block to the Soviet leaders. The West will be focusing its eyes on Russia for the next few months to see whether the new regime can successfully handle the problem of the peasantry