Atomic Agreement

After a savage propaganda attack branding the United States as a war-monger, Andrei Vishinsky startled his United Nations audience last week by offering a new Soviet proposal for controling the atomic bomb. In light of Russia's unrelenting barrage of anti-American sentiment, the present plan is probably no more that a decoy to divert interest from President Eisenhower's suggestion of an atomic peace pool. Or it could be a last minute attempt to prevent the United States from winning full support for European defense unity. But because of the sudden reversal in the Soviet position, there must be a careful examination of the new offering to discover any real difference in the Russian attitude.

Until now the Soviets have loudly advocated an immediate outlawing of atomic weapons and a general agreement that would make war a moral crime. Like the ill-fated Kellog Briand pact of the 'twenties, this scheme gave no guarantee of enforcement, and even if carried out, would have left Russia with a decisive advantage in conventional weapons. The plan also dodged the touchy problem of general disarmament. While the current proposal does remove some of the United States' objections, there remain many pitfalls in Russia's two stage plan for arms reduction.

In the first phase of disarmament, Russia would have all nations reduce conventional arms by fifty percent of "agreed norms." But in the past, during discussion of a U.N. police force, for example, the Kremlin has shown unusual ideas about the nature of fair "norms." Little value will come from the new proposal until the Soviets are willing to forego their dictionary of one-sided definitions. An even greater danger point is the weak system for checking the first stage of disarmament. The only control would be a temporary commission with the dubious power of requesting "the necessary information" concerning compliance with the reduction measures.

The problem of effective inspection and control becomes even more acute under the second phase of the plan. During this period all countries would end the manufacture of atomic weapons. Although the Soviet finally seems to agree that inspection is a vital part of a disarmament program, the U.S. must be sure that the inspection control commission is ready to operate before atomic reduction, and that Russia will allow a thorough survey of its plants.

If the USSR will show definite indications of good faith on these issues, the new proposal holds the possibility for actual disarmament gains. But the United States must not be so anxious to find merit in the Soviet plan that it becomes tangled in a web of fruitless argument and delay. Should this happen the hopeful steps made with the "atoms for peace" program will be lost in the storms of debate.