Aid for Indo-China

With the glimmer of a Korean truce in the ofling, the Administration could walk into public acclaim and out of world leadership by turning its back on Asia. But in the new Dulles plan to send arms to Indo-China and earmark some of our French funds for use in that war, the free world can find assurance that the United States is not going to pack its bag and get out of Asia as soon as the truce is settled.

Indo-China is a particularly appropriate place to carry on our resistance to Communist aggression; the war there is not stagnant like its Korean counterpart. Since China has no troops committed to the Communist army, a strong offensive could win the war. With a comparatively small addition of arms aid, there is an excellent chance that the Vietnamese troops could reinforce their territory behind the Communist lines and use it as a foothold for all out attack.

Sending these arms and giving extra money specified for use in Indo-China will help cut down the drain on the French economy. Each yearn France has spent over a billion dollars of her own money, forty-three percent of the military budget, and diverted half a billion in U.S. aid to fight this war. Once freed, much of this money could be used to build divisions for European defense.

And the second part of the new policy, direct arms aid for Indo-China, will give the Vietnam government more autonomy. The villagers, who are not enthusiastic about fighting for a French army after years of European domination, may be more willing to cooperate with an army that is truly their own. Vietnam needs their support to solidify any offensive.

By spending more money on Indo-China now, the United States may end a war that would otherwise drag on indefinitely, and at the same time gain the confidence of the people of Vietnam. We hope that this type of clear thinking will characterize the new State Department policy in Asia.