White Case in Perspective: Politics and Laxity

The heaming master of ceremonies noisily rapped his fork against a water glass. Round the long luncheon table sat some of the leading lights in the Chicago business world. The meal had been good, quite good. Leisurely they chatted and un-wrapped expensive Havanas. The MC grew slightly irritated; they quieted. The speaker was introduced in extravagant terms; they applauded, extravagantly. As was usual, they only half listened to the after dinner speech. Half listened, until they heard the words: "...White was known to be a Communist spy by the very people who appointed him to the most sensitive and important position he ever hold." An angry buzz, the properly indignant grant, a happy I-told-you-so smile. As one executive calmly lit his cigar, Attorney General Herbert Brownell lit the fuse that set off partisan charge and countercharge across the nation.

Most observers think Brownell chose both the wrong place and the wrong words to open his accusations of laxity toward security risks by the Truman Administration. The same observers generally agree, however, that potentially dangerous laxity did exist.

At Harvard, as elsewhere, the controversial White case stirred considerable interest. Not since the last national election had Republicans and Democrats in the House dining halls and at the Faculty Club fired such loud broadsides of political argument and invective at each other. Under pressure of publicity and debate the White case broadened into the spies-in-government issue. Discussion then turned to the three evils: Communism, McCarthyism, and Original Sin.

In order to learn the considered views of seasoned observers, this reporter interviewed a half dozen politically-minded professors in the College and Law School. But before presenting their opinions some background highlights are necessary.

Charges of intrigue first made headlines in mid-summer 1948 when Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, self-confessed former underground agents, told the House Un-American Activities Committee about organized spying in government. Alger Hiss was high up on Chambers' prescription list and in time went to prison, convicted of perjury committed before an espionage-seeking committee.

'Red Herring'

Repercussions over the Chambers-Bentley testimony waxed hot. Politicians, spurred by patriotic fervor and desire for national notoriety, shouted of widespread Communist infiltration into key government policy posts. "Red herring!" countered President Truman and he dismissed the charges as cheap political attempts to discredit his Administration. But indications clearly pointed toward infiltration and systematic espionage, especially in the Executive Department.

In the wave of New Dealism that swept government in the early thirties some clandestine Communists were washed into new, hyper-liberal Federal agencies. Communism was not considered a menace per so in those days of a discouragingly sickly economy. It was quite fashionable in some circles to speak in shocking left-wing slogans. Dedicated New Dealers, earnest Fabians, and mildly argumentative Communists were often hard to distinguish.

According to the testimony of Chambers and Nathaniel Weyl, the first functional Red cell in Federal government came into being in 1933. Others followed. The secret work of cell-members was sometimes pure spying, sometimes subtle influence of policy by advancing careerists. Accused of being early cell members were Alger Hiss, Harold Ware, Victor Perlo, John Abt, Charles Kramer, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Henry Wadleigh '33, and Harry Dexter White. The last two, according to testimony, were not organizational Communists but were willing to play ball with the "apparatus." Other once-prominent government officials later accused of espionage activities were Harold Glasser, Nathan Silvermaster, V. Frank Coe and William L. Ullmann.

In 1939 Chambers told Adolf A. Berle, then Assistant Secretary of State in charge of security, about his cell and its operations. Berle circulated a confidential memo to high officials describing Chambers' charges; apparently it, received scant attention or belief since many of those named continued to rise in power.

A distraught Elizabeth Bentley in 1945 spilled her story of Communist spying to the FBI. She listed many whom Chambers and others had named earlier. Loud denials of William Remington, a Commerce Department employee, that he was a member of the Bentley group led to his perjury conviction on an allied charge of Communist membership.

One month ago Brownell initiated his headline-making disclosures of laxity which he addressed a luncheon conference of the Executive Club of Chicago saying, "White was known to be a Communist by the very people who appointed him to the most sensitive and important position he ever held."

McCarthy Jumps In

Private Citizen Harry S. Truman's first reaction was: "I don't recall that such a thing happened. As soon as we found out that White was wrong, we fired him." When records showed White resigned (fifteen months after he took office), was not fired, Truman observed: "People are sometimes fired by being allowed to resign."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower quickly asserted that no one questioned the loyalty of the former President. Brownell hastily agreed with the Chief Executive. Congressman Harold Velde rushed to subpoena Truman but he tripped over his Committee's by-laws and popular resentment. Senator Joseph McCarthy tried to make himself to focal issue in the 1954 election but Eisenhower said he hoped the whole spies-in-government excitement would be a matter of history by the next election and that the GOP would run on its legislative program. Many claimed the President couldn't control his own lieutenants; other praised his political acumen in staying above the mudslinging.

Friends of Truman circulated the report that the former President--with the advice and connivance of FBI Chief J. Edger Hoover--allowed White's promotion in order not to tip off the Soviet spy apparatus and allow the FBI to collect more evidence. The story sounded plausible and Truman did not contradict it. But Hoover did.

In a nationwide address Truman said Brownell's charges were false, that he lied. He added, "The course we took protected the public interest and security and ...permitted the intensive FBI investigation then in progress to go forward. No other course could have served both purposes."

Brownell and a surprise witness, FBI Chief Hoover, appeared before the Jenner Internal Security Subcommittee the very next day. Said Hoover: "At no time was the FBI a party to an agreement to promote White. ...He was a member of the U. S. Monetary Commission, (whose) premises are extraterritorial, and the FBI does not have any right to follow any ... person onto (its) property. ...We were certainly hampered."

Hoover told of two reports on Communist activity which included White's name that were delivered to the White House in Nov. and Dec. 1945. When the FBI heard White's name had been sent to the Senate for confirmation as US Director of the International Monetary Fund, a 28-page dossier of secret information "whose reliability has been established either by inquiry or long-established observation and evaluation," was delivered to Gen. Harry Vaughan on Feb. 4, 1946. The following observation was made in that report: "As will be observed, information has come to the attention of this Bureau charging White as being a valuable adjunct to an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, D. C." In all, seven reports mentioning White were sent to the White House between Nov. 8, 1945 and July 24, 1946.

'Unfit for Service'

Truman said he received an FBI report on White on Feb. 6, 1946, after the Senate had confirmed his new appointment. On receiving the dossier, he reportedly conferred with State Secretary James Byrnes and Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson. Vinson then went into a huddle with Hoover and Attorney General Tom Clark. All three agreed White was "unfit for service."

Since the FBI's evidence against White was not sufficient to indict him at that time, Hoover spoke of three alternatives Vinson and Clark planned to present to Truman: 1) Fire White without explanation; 2) Ask him to resign without explanation; 3) Allow him to take the new post, while the Attorney General continued the investigation and the Treasury Secretary supervised the appointment of reliable men around White. Truman adopted the last alternative, but White somehow was permitted to surround himself with suspected Communists.

Hoover stressed the point that Truman did not adopt that course on his advice. "At no time was the FBI a party to an agreement to promote Harry Dexter White and at no time did the FBI give its approval to such an agreement. Such an agreement ...would be inconceivable." The FBI, he maintains, does not advise but informs However, it is clear that through his reports, and through private conversation with Vinson and Clark, Hoover did advise the Administration of White's dangerous activities and warned them against advancing the security risk to the highly sensitive post of the Monetary Fund.

After Harry Dexter White entered the Treasury Department as a research assistant in 1934, he rose steadily into high position and gained the personal favor of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthan. On the heels of Pearl Harbor, White was empowered under Department Order 43 with "full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department has to deal having a bearing on foreign relations." Under the same order he was to serve as liaison between Treasury and State and manage the $2,000,000,000 Stabilization Fund in international exchange.

Sworn testimony reports that during 1942 and 1943. White supplied secret documents from Treasury files to Nathan Silvermaster and William L. Ullmann.

According to some observers, Morgenthau's fiscal knowledge was very limited and he relied on White for considerable advice. White was author of the so-called Morgenthau Plan for destruction of German industry.

Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr., assistant professor of Government, thinks Brownell decided to make his White case disclosure because of two political considerations, one inter-party, the other intra-party. With Ike's legislative program begged down and dissatisfaction evident in organized labor and agriculture, GOP popularity was waning. The accusations of laxity were aimed at cutting the Roperrating of the Democrats, he believes. And since Eisenhower isn't expected to seek reelection, the "Brownell-Dewey Republicans are fighting the McCarthy Tribune Neanderthalers" for party leadership. "McCarthy's recent attack on the Administration shows he is aware of this technique."

"Certainly laxity existed" during the Truman Administration, Palamountain says. "It is understandable--but not excusable--in terms of the general environment. But the general laxity toward. White and his friends was somewhat inconsistent with Truman's loyalty boards (set up in March 1947) which I believe violated due process."

Charles R. Cherington '35, associate professor of Government, sees the whole spy case as pointing up the danger of Senator McCarthy. "Either McCarthy must be destroyed in American political life," Cherington warns, "or he will in due course destroy American Constitutional government. McCarthy, Jenner and Co. are not really interested in capturing Communists, they're interested in venting hate, frustration, and anti-Semitism upon anyone or anything which appears to be a possible target." McCarthy seeks the Presidency in '56 "as a stepping stone to unconstitutional, treasonable seizure of power. This is the type of issue which could well result in civil war," Cherington insists in all seriousness, but agrees, "We'll get this man before it becomes necessary to take to the field to defend against losing our liberties.

"I think Harry Truman did a great disservice in the way he replied to Brownell's charges. This is the time to stick to the central issues: preservation of Constitutional safeguards and avoidance of un-Constitutional, un-gentlemanly, and un-Christian conduct on the part of persons in public light."

McCarthy Dictatorship

Cherington nurses grave doubts about Hoover's role in the White case. "The use of the head of secret police as a witness for political purposes is a portent of things to come. Mr. Hoover possesses files which in times of excitement, passion and departure from due process of law could be used as the justification for imprisoning half a million Americans in concentration campus. I think the FBI now in a position to become the police arm of a McCarthy dictatorship. I think Mr. Hoover is quite capable of operating in this fashion. Despite his denials, Mr. Hoover has been actively engaged in politics since he became director of the FBI in the '20s. He is a power-loving man."

Mark DeWolfe Howe '28, professor of Law, deplores Brownell's selecting only politically favorable information from FBI files for publication. "He's going on the assumption that anything advantageous for the Republicans the public ought to know. All that's been established (by the whole White business) is a little sloppiness in the White House and perhaps a mistaken decision. No evidence has come out to show that any damage was done to the nation.

"I think Eisenhower says something on Monday. does something else on Tuesday, and qualifies both on Wednesday," Howe says. "He has shown a complete failure to control his subordinates." Regarding Dulles' and Eisenrower's recent rebuke of McCarthy, he states, "I think they'll do some qualifying of the vigor of yesterday."

Wires Crossed

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. '38, associate professor of History, feels Brownell for political reasons "created a deliberately false impression of the problems that faced Truman in 1946" when he shifted White from the Treasury to the International Monetary Fund. Given the situation that existed at that time, the Truman Administration's laxity was not in appointing White to a new position, but in allowing him to recruit security risks for his staff, Schlesinger says. Somehow, between Vinson's resignation and John Snyder's appointment, the wires were carelessly crossed.

He believes that Truman was forced to choose the last of three possible alternatives. Since Hoover insisted that under no circumstances could the charges against White be made public, Truman would appear in the position of "destroying the life and career of an apparently able and respected official. White was a skilled infighter and would have raised hell about this. There is no question in my mind that White was leaking information, but I doubt if it could have been proven.

"Elizabeth Bentley never saw White," Schlesinger continues, "Her evidence was all hearsay. But Bentley did work directly with Silvermaster, and Ullmann. Since J. Edgar Hoover says everything she says is true, why not indict these two?"

Schlesinger admits that Truman resorted to "a careless, slothful kind of action to get White out of his hair," but criticizes Brownell and Hoover who "seven years later; on the basis of much better evidence, are failing to take as drastic action as they expected Truman to take in 1946."

Daniel S. Cheever, assistant professor of Government, thinks the whole range of politically inspired spy hunts are merely "a device for making political hay." He would like to see non-partisan groups of respected citizens investigate subversion and report to the people rather than Congressional committees.

"I am convinced that the hounding of career people by individual Congressmen is very, very wrong. I don't mind holding people responsible for failure, but not for judgement. It is enough now to make a public insinuation to discredit a man in the public eye and deter him from doing his work. Career services should not be a football of politics," he insists.

Robert Braucher, professor of Law, denounces Truman's "funny trails" which came in with the loyalty boards set up by Executive Order in the spring of 1947. No witnesses appeared; the suspected security or loyalty risk was confronted with anonymous charges and asked to answer them, Braucher explains. "The kangaroo courts were an evil development of Truman's tightening-up process."

Braucher thinks the Communists-in-government issue is about ended, but sees further ominous, headline-seeking investigation of Communists is industry. "I'm a little bit scared by this whole development. If you extend loyalty probes to private business, you may end up with a sort of ostracism of people. This is quite dangerous when, on the pretext of security, you can force people to starve."

He thinks the GOP will try to parlay its attacks on Truman into long range political cannon-fodder. "In tennis they say when you find an opponent with a wooden leg you force him from side to side, forward and back. You want to tire him. In politics you do much the same thing. The Democrats for twenty years thought they had a man with a wooden leg in Herbert Hoover. Now the Republicans have found their man with a wooden leg: Harry Truman.