Atoms and the U.N.

Recovering the initiative in the cold war once again, President Eisenhower has given Soviet Russia a clear opportunity to show its purported good will. In his speech before the U.N. on Tuesday, he called on the Russians to join in a project to stockpile atomic fuel for peaceful uses. This time, even if Russia again weasels on atomic controls, the United States can only gain in its struggle to solidify Western Europe's defenses.

The attitude of this nation to the President's proposals has been one of optimism, qualified by the experience gained through seven years of cold war. Some hopeful observers point out that the new plan contains little that the USSR might find offensive. Unlike the Baruch proposals of 1945 which the Russians rejected, the Eisenhower offer makes no attempt to monopolize atomic power in an international commission. But even though the plan has been freed from this stigma, there seems little hope for its quick acceptance.

The question of international atomic control has always been up to the Russians. At no time from the end of World War II to the present, would the West have rejected a reasonable proposal. Indeed, there has been a tacit standing offer during that entire period. Had the Russians any real desire to develop the atom on a peaceful basis in cooperation with the West, they might have made an offer long ago.

The President has stated that he would seek to make the plan self-enforcing and fool-proof, and at the same time has mentioned the "ratios of contributions (to the the stockpile), the procedures and other details" to be worked out in private conversations. But it is plain that the very life of the plan depends on a successful resolution of the disagreements over details. More than once the Russians have sabotaged a Western peace overture through unreasonable demands over procedure.

Whether or not the Kremlin policy makers find the new proposals acceptable, the action taken by the West is itself a good sign. Eisenhower has keynoted a policy which may again put the West on the diplomatic offensive and force Russia to cooperate in a fair proposal or by rejecting a joint commission, stimulate increased defense preparations in the United States and Western Europe.