Malenkov's Regime Trys to Confuse West, Fainsod Says

The Kremlin is working to quiet fears of Soviet aggression, and to confuse and divide Western opinion about Soviet intentions, Merle E. Fainsod, professor of Government, concludes in his new study on political workings in Russia.

In his book, "How Russia is Ruled," Fainsod, director of political studies at Harvard's Russian Research Center, says, "Whether the present phase of defensive consolidation will be long-lasting will depend in considerable measure on the success which the new leadership enjoys in stabilizing its authority."

One internal problem Malenkov faces is the widespread hatred of the secret police. "yet," Fainsod continues, "the existence of the secret police is indispensable to the regime.

"It depends on its specialists in terror to extirpate any thought of opposition or resistance. The very power of the secret police is also a symbol of weakness."

Based on Reports and Interviews

Fainsod's book, published this week by the Harvard University Press, is based on hundreds of refugees' reports and interview material. The project was the first study made of the lives and attitudes of a large group of Soviet citizens from all professions.

The author discusses the unique problem of the Soviet elite who are favored beneficiaries of the system and yet forced to live under constant threat of purge.

The Soviet police organizations, designed to keep watch on others, are no less subject to scrutiny and constant inspection than the lower-classes.

"Leading members of the secret police become tempting targets for liquidation as they accumulate the unsavory secrets of the regime and build up the power which makes them a potential threat," Fainsod says.

Beria's Fall Follows Precedent

Lavrenti Beria's fall from the Soviet hierarchy follows the pattern of his predecessors in running Russia's secret police, Fainsod observes.

He also points out that no head of the Soviet secret police has succeeded in using his position as a base from which to strike out for supreme power.

Fainsod traces the history of the first director of the Cheka and OGPU, Felix Dzerzhinsky, who "gave no evidence of Napoleonic ambitions and died in 1926 without attaining Politburo status."

His successors, Menzhinsky, Yagoda, and Yezhov, were either political nonentities or scapegoats in purges. Beria's rise, the author believes, was evidence of Stalin's tutelage rather than a boost from NKVD leadership.

Besides the pressures which all members of the elite are under, Fainsod comments on the double pressures of the scientist, professional man, and artist who must feat the secret police and also the danger of contradicting "Party truths" in the course of their work.

Fainsod concludes that "many members of the elite would probably welcome an alternative regime which ministered to their urge for security and stability."

There is more hatred of the Communist regime among the lower classes in Russia than among any other group, however. The biggest center of discontent is among the farmers; and collective farms rank with the secret police and Party controls as hated features of the regime.

In obtaining his material, Fainsod found that most of the Soviet emigres reflect unconsciously the authoritarian influence of their training. They think, he observes, in black and white, and have a tendency toward paternalistic controls.

Despite their hatred of Russia's rule of terror, Fainsod says, the emigres "continue to cherish a deep patriotic attachment to the homeland which they have abandoned.