The People and the A-Bomb

Newspapers reported a revealing conversation last week when a high government official called to check a statement with the Atomic Energy Commission. Instructed by President Eisenhower to clear all remarks on defense with the Commission, the official asked for the authorized answer to "How powerful a hydrogen bomb can Russia drop on us now?"

The Commission had a stock reply, "Tell 'cm you don't know."

This answer was neither flippant nor unusual. It points to an Administration attitude which is as dangerous as it is secretive. Through occasional, indefinite government releases, the American knows vaguely of a crisis, but its extent or imminence have been carefully withheld from him. No wonder then that he is apathetic to atomic threats.

Some thoughtful Americans have seen the consequences of this code of ignorance. David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for four years, has recently warned that for America's safety citizens must be allowed to participate in the defense program.

For Lilienthal the situation is especially vivid. He remembers those nervous years after VJ Day when our friendship with Russia was cooling rapidly. At that time, the government was well-satisfied to entrust its defense to a cheap, and supposedly invincible, stockpile of atom bombs.

Now, with reports that Russia has the secret of hydrogen power, we must re-examine our entire philosophy of defense. Scientists are already working on a superhydrogen bomb, yet by now it should be clear that bombs of any size can never serve as a lone defense.

Reassessment of Policy

Preparedness for America means many reassessments of our past defense policy. The role of the Navy and Army, the degree of cooperation between service branches, the strength of our civil defense program--all are problems and important ones. There is also the technological possibility of radar warning systems and guided missile destruction of attacking enemy bombers. These facets of defense cannot be set up in the vacuum of a laboratory. They depend on public support for instigation and effectiveness. Such support can only come from public realization that the biggest bomb is not in itself the best answer to defense problems. Entertainment media were used with great effect in the past war; now, with the addition of television, the defense situation could be made more lucid and vital to the American people than ever before.

If not handled capably, a program of information to Americans could, as some censors fear, mean secrets revealed to the Communists. But with the President making the defense announcements, in a coherent whole rather than contradictory piecemeal, there would be little chance of the Communists profiting. There is much latitude before the government would pass from the necessary open appraisal of our defense situation to top-drawer and justifiably secret information.

Expanded civil defense programs and the other suggested means of preparedness would neither guarantee peace nor, in case of war, victory. At this point it is impossible to know the extent of our strength and weaknesses. In any event, however, an informed public, active in defense measures, is preferable to an indifferent one.

The President has said that we must avoid a panic in this country over the prospect of hydrogen warfare, and he is right. But here again there is a large gap between knowledge and panic; Americans have in the past absorbed defense education without falling into blinding fear. The administration has perhaps dwelt too long on the fable of the boy who cried wolf without reason and needlessly alarmed his neighbors. It would be well to consider also the boy who saw the wolf but neglected to cry out; he was devoured quickly and silently.