No Substitute

Those people who have been wating for the testimony of General MacArthur to clear up some of the confusion about our Far Eastern policy and to provide some clear and workable alternative to the Administration's program must have been disappointed by the General's statements to Congress last week.

MacArthur did succeed in maintaining his rigid pose for the photographers and in taking some hefty swipes at the Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but his position had many holes, both in form and in content, that weakened his assertions.

In form, for instance, he admitted his ignorance of our military needs in the European theatre, saying that the Administration has responsibility for global strategy. But at the same time, he put forth a detailed global policy of his own, one which envisions world communism rather than Russian expansion as the principal enemy and which implies a certain proportion of strength in different areas.

The content of his policy also contained striking paradoxes. He condemned the "limited war" we are now waging in Korea, yet advocated a "limited war" against China that would not involved the use of American ground forces on the Chinese mainland. He attacked our allies for their reluctance to participate in the Korean war, yet proposed that we "go it alone" against China if those allies are in disagreement with the policy he suggests.

There is always room for discussion of our foreign policy by any expert, be he an old soldier or and old diplomat or anything else. But there is no room, and no time, for a gruffly political exchange that has political ends. In war, not even election campaigns are a substitute for victory.