Formosa

Formosa today is a shabby monument to the policy of "containing Communism" by supporting anybody who opposes it. These several hundred thousand troops living partially on U. S. doles are a sad commentary on the shortsightedness of American diplomacy, which backed the politics of Chiang Kai-Shek against the reforms of the Mao-Tse Tung.

If they were just a sad commentary, a textbook lesson for budding State Department men, these troops would not be so bad. But the fact is that the educational tableau will not break up when we have finished showing it to the class. It is still on our hands, and we can only hope that the United Nations will find some way of disposing of it for us.

Secretary of State Acheson almost got rid of it last January when he stopped American aid to Chiang. It looked for a time as if we might manage to patch up our Asia policy with Point Four aid and other positive measures, and escape the worst consequences of our Chinese bungle.

But six months later, when the Korean war began, Acheson picked up the hot potato again. It can be argued that he had to do this to prevent a possible invasion of Formosa and the consequent deterioration of the American strategic position in the Pacific, but propaganda-wise it was another bad mistake. It appeared as if America were reiterating its support of the discredited regime.

So, as quickly as possible, Acheson got rid of the hot potato once more, this time throwing it to the United Nations. But he didn't get rid of it entirely--America is a member of the U.N. and is therefore still part-owner of the same old potato.

When the time comes this fall, Warren Austin has to march into the U.N. meeting to discuss the Formosa problem, and be all things to all men. To the U. S. public he will have to be solidly anti-Communist; to the Chinese Communists he will have to be a dispassionate suitor; to India he will have to be the friend of Asian nationalism; to France he will have to be the friend of French Indo-China. To make it more difficult he will go in as spokesman of a large bloc of world opinion.

What to Do?

What does America want as the solution to the Formosan crisis?

Above all it wants a settlement; a deadlock will leave it pretty much where it is now and that is no place to be.

Is the best thing then to hand Formosa over to the Communists? With the American public being what it is, the delegation can never support this or vote for it, but it has merits as a solution. It does at least promise to remove Chiang from the scene, and it may satisfy many middle-of-the-road Asian nations that the U. S. is not the big bad imperialistic wolf they have been hearing about. Of course, if the U. N. finds that the Cairo and Yalta agreements are binding, then the U. S. will have to approve, if only tacitly, the return of Formosa to Communist China. To back Chiang's claim to Formosa under these agreements would be suicidal.

Far better from the point of view of the U. S. would be some sort of United Nations trusteeship. Unfortunately such a plan would be extremely difficult to push past the Communist objections in the U.N.--especially if these objections were supported by a military attack across the strait.

Furthermore, this program would only be desirable if it were supported by several key Asiatic nations, India particularly. Without their support, any U. S.-sponsored plan would fail in its most important task: that of convincing independent Asia of the good intentions of the United States.

Supposing, therefore, that a U.N. trusteeship is the best solution America can hope for, how should our U.N. delegation go about trying to get one? The answer is the classic one for handling all desperately embarrassing situations: to keep as quiet as possible until the thing is settled, not to advertise our long series of mistakes in China.

A policy of quietness on Chinese affairs for a few months will do no harm to our chances of ultimately achieving a U.N. Commission for Formosa. Unless that Commission is extremely popular, especially with such an excellent weathercock as India, we don't want to be in the forefront of a fight for it. If, however, the right countries are on our side, then our leadership will not be required.

The United States cannot afford to make another mistake in Chinese affairs. Its position in Asia is too weak to stand many more severe blows. In discussing the Formosa issue in the U.N., therefore, the U. S. should take care to be extremely circumspect. This is one time in modern world politics when making a big noise will not pay off.