Pact for Peace

The North Atlantic Pact, most recent attempt to settle the confused international picture, will be signed next week, offering the propaganda-weary people of the world a glimpse of a possibility for a secure peace. The recently revealed text of the Pact shows clearly its intent and its dangers.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the treaty is that, if ratified by the Senate, it will be an official end to American isolationism. The European Recovery Program acknowledged only a temporary interest by the United States in European prosperity. The Pact, however, states that an armed attack against any signer of the Pact "shall be considered an attack against them all." This is the assurance our nation gives to the peoples of Europe that the United States will not again sit by and watch them succumb to aggression.

Throughout the treaty, there is a determined effort to prove that the Pact is in perfect-accord with the United Nations Charter. Although the declaration that the nations of Europe and North America constitute one regional area is indeed a strained interpretation of the UN Charter, it is a necessary interpretation. The signers do not want to do away with the United Nations; they believe the UN is the source of eventual peace and prosperity, as stated in the preamble and article one of the Pact. But the UN is clearly unable to cope with the present crisis. Its Charter was based on continued cooperation of the Big Five. Until this cooperative spirit reappears, the UN cannot solve major international problems. It is also impossible to strengthen the UN so long as the present attitude of mutual distrust prevails. The Pact allows for the growth of the UN, saying that any military action taken under the treaty "shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

The charge that the Pact is another dart thrown into Russia's side which may elicit a similar diplomatic maneuver behind the Iron Curtain is unfortunately valid. But the value of the Pact in removing small nations' fears for survival among powerful neighbors compensates for this difficulty.

Mucli of the Pact's success will depend on intelligent policy decisions in the future and recognition of problems that may arise. One such problem is what constitutes an act of aggression. Secretary of State Acheson has said that a purely internal revolution is not aggression, but if that revolution is obviously promoted by a foreign power, it is aggression. This is a difficult borderline doctrine. Another problem is to strike the essential balance in channelling European economy between recovery and rearment. A major purpose of the Pact is to relieve small nations of overburdening war expenditure. It would be disastrous if Pact Mutual defeat plans induced an african spirt which overshadowed recovery.

In spite of Russian propaganda, the Pact is a purely defensive alliance. The hope for peace through the Pact comes from the promise that it will stabilize the European political scene. The Pact draws a clear line between East and West. Each side knows that crossing that line will bring would disaster. Antagonism, may, therefore, lose its value, and the door to cooperation through the UN can be opened. The Pact is the means to this end, and the end must never be forgotten in a struggle to strengthen the means.

The United States, as the key nation is this treaty, undertakes the greatest responsibility in its history. World peace depends on the successful use of the Pact in untangling post-war disorder.