Soviet Stall

In his interview with Mr. Stassen, Marshal Stalin expressed the belief that the United States and Russia can resolve their differences by cooperation, but the record of proceedings at the Moscow Conference makes it plain the Soviet leaders expect that the United States will eventually do most of the "cooperating." Both Secretary Marshall and Mr. Dulles report that the Four Power conclave split up over the failure of the two major participants to reach even the most limited agreement on key provisons of the German treaty.

Neither country expects the stalemate to continue indefinitely. Mr. Stalin and the American Secretary of State have said that a compromise will be reached; but from the Russian point of view, the later, the better. If the Russian expectation of an economic crisis in the United States is fulfilled, this nation will be hard pressed to maintain its occupation troops in Europe, and Russia's bargaining power will be enormously increased.

That Russia has chosen to play the game in this fashion does not mean that she is committed to indefinite expansion. But even if the most serious sin of which the Soviet is guilty is that of nationalism, the Kremlin's delaying tactics, as practiced in the Foreign Ministers' Conference and in negotiations for atomic control; are ill adapted to the promotion of world peace.

The unsettled state of Europe, the dread potentialities of atomic war, and a lack of faith by the United States and Russia in one another's motives, have produced a condition of tenseness in which the original spirit of the United Nations plays a very poor second to national interest.

The areas of American and Russian disagreement were crystallized at Moscow. In order to promote a satisfactory compromise as early as possible, the United States must demonstrate its economic stability. The maintenance of domestic prosperity and the fostering of a foreign policy which leaves the door open for compromise are the greatest contributions that America can make to world security.