FEED THE HUNGRY

For the peoples of Europe this promises to be a winter they will not like to remember. Over looking the comparatively minor discomforts of an empty coal cellar or gasoline tank, the tragedy facing these people is one of empty cupboards. Yet the aid of a country usually quick to relieve suffering wherever it may be has been held up by a remarkable amount of dissension and debate. There have been conflicting reports thick as snowflakes as to the seriousness of the food shortage; there have ben rash and hasty prophecies of the abuses and misdirection into which food relief would fall.

As to the first point, the extent of the danger facing Europe's defeated millions, a report issued last month by Professor John D. Black of the Economics Department furnishes an authoritative and dispassionate guide. Black discounts pictures of mass starvation this winter, believing that well-rationed reserves will suffice to prevent a catastrophe of that extent. But with the German people first in line at the pantry door, with crops this year "well below normal," and with transportation disorganized and distributive channels disrupted, he does not see how widespread; disease-inviting malnutrition can be avoided. Rejecting the more dire forecasts, it appears fairly certain that outside relief is urgently necessary to prevent an incalculable amount of misery and the disasters of epidemics.

With this in mind, the task is to find a relief program that will gain the cooperation of the British and German governments. The most promising proposal made so far is that of Herbert Hoover, America's Number One war relief expert. His idea is to let the occupied countries buy food-stuffs here with their liquid assets now in this country, and carry it home in their own ships. Added to this would be the food contributed by numerous charities; the total should be enough to tide the needy over the worst months. Careful distribution of the food by a relief organization modeled on Hoover's Belgian Relief Commission of the last war would insure its consumption by the most deserving families. If at any time it appeared that the food was going to Germany, the shipments could be halted immediately.

Such a qualified program should meet the British objections that food relief would be an aid to Germany's war effort. To shift responsibility for the food shortage upon Hitler may be good propaganda, but is hardly a realistic or humane attitude. There simply is not enough food in Europe to go around, nor the means of getting it around to all. The Germans have done what any victor in their position would do--have taken what they need and left the others to make out as well as they can with what is left. According to the Black report "the Germans have surely taken possession of the reserves of breadstuffs in the occupied countries--have requisitioned or purchased considerable livestock--have purchased much of the dairy and poultry output--." The relief shipments would be the margin between malnutrition and a relatively healthy subsistence, for the people from whom this food is being taken. Since it is to the interests of Germany that the occupied areas be not cesspools of spreading disease and revolutionary discontent, it is hard to see why these shipments should encourage the occupiers to take more than they need at home. If it should appear that the importation of relief shipments was merely resulting in increased exportation to Germany, the whole project would have to be dropped as futile.

Negotiations to put this plan into effect would have to be undertaken by the State Department with British and German representatives. Both belligerents would have to assure the food ships safe passage through blockaded and submarine-haunted waters. Neither has anything to gain from the sufferings of peoples unable now to count in the balance of military power. Upon the shoulders of the recalcitrant party would rest the responsibility for whatever calamities may eventuate from a foodless Europe this winter.