PEACE IN OUR TIME

Militant democratic sympathy brands immediately as heresy and concessions to the ogre Hitler. Accordingly it rejects as insulting the vaguest mention of a peace concluded over the body of prostrate Poland. And-together with the isolationists-it emphatically demands that President Roosevelt spurn the role of peace mediator.

Standing opposite these sentiments are three coldly arresting facts. First: here is the final opportunity to call a stop before European civilization lurches to perdition. Second: there seem to be reasons for hoping that peace is not an impossibility at this juncture. Three: America's best chance for peace lies in an immediate end of the war. In the light of these facts, it is clear that the President is almost under an obligation to exert every office he possesses to bring about such a peace.

Here is a case of two warring powers, England and Germany, both painfully eager to end the fight after the first preliminary round. It would be the saddest event in all history if their peace hopes were frustrated merely because neither is in a position to make direct overtures. Obviously there must be a third power to bring them together, and just as obviously, the President of the United States is in the most logical position to act.

Mr. Roosevelt's first steps would have to be taken along secret diplomatic channels. He would have to ascertain in advance that there is some common ground for a settlement. Should either side by any chance or for any reason refuse his offer, hatreds in Europe and America would flame only the more hotly.

It would be necessary to know positively that the Nazis were sincere in their proposals. On the face, Hitler's speech reeks of a thousand old assurances and a thousand old lies. Yet this time his desire for peace may be real enough, even if his appetite is not appeased enough, that he will give Mr. Roosevelt definite guaranties of his good faith. He has never before offered to disarm.

On the other hand, the President would have to be assured of a receptive British attitude. This is very likely, since English leaders must be frightened as never before in their centuries of bull-headed progress. There is every possibility-almost a probability-of English defeat. At the best, Britain can expect destruction of all her industrial concentrations and the loss of the tremendous store of invested wealth which she has been amassing ever since Drake brought home the Golden Hind. At the worst she can expect extreme political and economic humiliation. Peace is wisest by far.

Such a peace cannot be tossed off as mere surrender. It is a peace based on solid reality. The restoration of the old Poland is an utter impossibility, come what may. The war would be ended now not in the light of what should be done but in the light of what can be done.

It would involve considerable concessions to Hitlerdom. It would mean a puppet Poland, and eventually it would mean a free economic hand for the Nazis in eastern Europe. There would have to be a redistribution of colonies. But if Hitler could be made to disarm, the victory would be likewise great for the democracies. Hitlerism-gangsterism as a diplomatic weapon-would be gone, and Europe could once more breathe easy. The British and French Empires would be reasonably intact. And there would be peace for our time.

To the United States, this solution is the happiest conceivable regardless of our strong democratic sympathies. It would save us from a probable re-enactment-only on a more terrible scale of the 1917 debacle. To the world as a whole, such a peace would be a boon from the gods. It would forestall a war which is beyond comprehension in its savage intensity, and which could well presage a return to barbarism.