OF HERRINGS AND CURRENCIES

There is much that is obscure and troublesome in the new tri-partite agreement between France, Britain, and the United Stats. It was, for example, confusing and irrelevent for Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to drag the Russian herring across the trail and speak of a "raid" upon the pound when the Soviet Bank was merely carrying on a pre-arranged commercial transaction of minor proportions. And neither is it especially clarifying to approach the agreement from the political side, to glory in the "offensive" upon dictatorships by democratic countries.

It is at once a question of larger, and less political, importance; one worth mulling over in a spirit of cautions hopefulness. It is not, unfortunately, a program to be embraced ecstatically as a solution for all of mankind's ills, to expect that commerce, peace, and plenty will naturally and immediately flow from this currency agreement.

For one thing, it should be self-evident by this time that "stabilization funds" are the instruments of economic nationalism, that secret manipulation of the exchange rates, like protective tariffs, is used for purely national ends. And today the three countries concerned have created vast stabilization funds and propose to use them separately within the vague framework of an informal agreement. With the understanding but a week old, yesterday's news brings report of a disagreement already existing between Great Britain and the United States as to what the parity should be between the dollar and the pound, for, as might be expected, the English bankers and economists have no especial love for the figure of $4.87 to the pound, the rate which played havoc with their trade during the twenties.

As for France, the Blum government seems to be trying whole-heartedly to make the agreement workable, apparently letting the franc reach its "natural limit" between the maximum and minimum stated values in gold. As evidence of its sincerity it cut tariffs yesterday to the extent of 15 to 20 per cent. There will be howls of rage and vigorous pressure applied upon the government as a consequence of this action, but, provided the Blum government isn't unhorsed in the kaleidoscopic changes of French politics, there is some hope of having stable monetary markets. However enduring the present French government, the transition from a gold-standard country to a nation with a devalued, regulated currency, accompanied by lower tariffs, adjusted wages, and higher prices, will not be easy.

Yet the agreement is a signpost to international cooperation, a light along the gloomy path of world relations. Handled delicately and sensibly it may lead, eventually, to a redistribution of gold and a return to the gold standard. Here, at last, is something to look forward to, not with foreboding, but with hope.