THE GUARD WITHOUT

General Pershing's plea to stop further reductions in the size of the regular army, made clear in a vigorous, straightforward statement the army's problem and should go far towards a general realization of what the army is up against. The proposals now before the House Appropriations Committee, somewhat overlooked in the news from Washington, favor a further reduction of the standing army to 115,000 men and 11,000 officers,--this in the name of "necessary economizing". Under the plan now in operation the army is already being reduced to 150,000 men and 13,000 officers, and that makes its necessary to spread the effectives pretty thin to cover the various posts. Coast defense units are everywhere being pared to the quick, and even at that all but the more important fortifications are being abandoned. Our contingent in Germany is being withdrawn. In the Philippines, in Hawaii, at Panama, barely enough men are maintained to man the necessary defences; and complaints are frequently coming in that the protention afforded is inadequate and leaves no margin of safety. This is the situation under the plan now in effect; further cutting down in the interests of temporary "economy" would imperil the whole National Defence scheme of 1920 and come dangerously near to being penny-wise and pound-foolish.

The effects of this vacillating course in military appropriations are being felt throughout the army. It discourages competent men from entering the service, because of the uncertainty and lack of permanency; at the same time it lowers the morale and efficiency within the organization, until it is getting to be almost impossible to use to best advantage the personnel.

Pershing's statement is not idle sabrerattling, calculated to stir up the alarmists, and is not in the least catering to a militarist party. He asks merely for permanency and continuity in the army policy in order to make possible high standards of morale and efficiency, and he wants to prevent further reduction in numbers, because the present force is barely large enough. As it is planned, the overhead organization effective at present is not wholly for the administration of the regular army, but is planned as the fundamental frame-work of the regulars, the reserves, and the potentials,--these last being the "citizen soldiery" to be built up on the standing army as a nucleus. There is no question that the plan of a "skeletonized army", if successful, is far more to be desired, than a large standing army; but in order to have it successful it is important that the bones of the skeleton should neither be too few nor too disorganized to support the weight of the body which is to be formed around them.