SINE QUA NON

Seldom, if ever, has the general attitude of the nations been more propitious for permanent disarmament. No such argument, however, will ever prove effective unless all the contracting parties are sincerely in favor of it. The failure of even one important state to cooperate means the virtual negation of all the efforts of the rest. Fortunately, at the coming Conference there will be represented but one country which might be thought to favor disarmament half-heartedly or not at all. That country is Japan.

The last twenty years have seen the gradual expansion of Japan on the continent of Asia. When, at the beginning of the War, the attention of the nations was concentrated on Europe, she occupied Shantung and made the famous Twenty-one Demands on China which were designed to end that country's control over her own affairs, political, military and financial Japan has indicated by her actions, in contrast to the suave statements of her diplomats, that she has the aspiration of building up a Japanese empire on the continent of Asia. Consequently, though she may be willing to agree to some small mutual limitation, no nation, with her ambitions can be expected to consent to any great reduction of armaments.

As long as Japan retains her present hope of dominating Asia, she will naturally need considerable armed forces. Here is likely to be the dissenting vote which will nullify the efforts of the Conference. Accordingly the problem which most seriously confronts the world today is how to induce Japan to change her policy.

People must not be mistaken in thinking that all of Japan is militaristic. There are, as a matter of fact, varied elements of thought and doctrine in Japan as there are in any country. Some of these elements, more liberal than others, are desirous of casting off the deceptive policy of the present militaristic government and of setting their country right in the eyes of the world. Unfortunately these liberal elements are not strong enough to make themselves effectively felt against the militarists who are in such a dominating position. So the only thing we can do is to so forcefully convince the Japanese delegates of the impropriety of their course that they will compel their government at home to substitute for the present imperialistic policy aspirations for the industrial development of Japan and trade abroad. In the forthcoming conference Anglo-American cooperation must and will be predominant.

If the combined moral force of these two nations, together with that of the world at large, proves unable to force the Japanese to change their program in fact as well as in word, the Conference will be a failure.