Trust Legislation.

Professor Jenks of Cornell, delivered the last of his series of lectures on trusts last night, on the subject of "Social Effects and Legislation."

Many writers on trusts think that the worst evil connected with them is their introduction of corruption into politics, but it is questionable whether trusts do this any more than corporations such as gas companies and railroads. The real evil lies in the legislative system, certain members of which introduce bills injurious alike to the trusts and the public, simply for the purpose of being bought off.

The social evils are of greater consequence. The democratic system of government needs individual self-reliance, and the competitive system in business develops this. Trusts bring about the opposite result, setting aside competition, and saving the weak by sheltering them in combinations. This makes little difference in the industrial world, for in the first case many of these weaker establishments would fail, and their creditors would thus suffer. Those who favor trusts say that by them inefficient men are kept from trying to do business independently, thus preventing a great economic evil, and that capable men are given good positions, good salaries, and good opportunities for developing their individual abilities under trusts. One of the worst evils of the trusts is the poor distribution of profits, giving little to the actual wage-earner and little to the stockholder.

There are many remedies to palliate the evil. The Interstate Commerce Act may be enforced so as to prevent discrimination of freight rates. Patent laws could be changed to leave the manufacture of any article free, but provide a royalty for the inventor, thus securing a reward for the right person.

One of the most important remedies would be enforced publicity, compelling the directors to run the company in the interests of the stock-holders, and doing away with the great profits of the promoter. This publicity would not necessarily betray any of the secrets of the business to a rival, for reports could be made only to stock-holders, which might be verified by a board of auditors chosen by the stock-holders themselves. Still it would probably be unwise to do anything further than to take away the special advantages of trusts, which verge on monopolies.