FIRST DEFEAT.

[Special dispatch to the CRIMSON.]

NEW HAVEN, May 1.- Yale won her first intercollegiate debate with Harvard tonight. The decision of the judges, made less than five minutes after the debate closed was announced as unanimous. Although the Harvard speakers had a well-knitted line of argument they were unable to clear it from the inconsistencies into which the Yale speakers endeavored to force it. There was wanting in the Harvard argument definiteness, a fault which afforded an easy point of attack for the Yale men. Still the Harvard argument taken by itself was strong, but was not presented so forcibly as the Yale argument. All the Yale speakers had splendid form. Clark's skill in analysis was perhaps their strongest weapon. For Harvard, Stewar dspoke best, making the most effective of the rebuttal speeches.

F. R. Steward opened the debate for Harvard in a guarded and conservative speech. He spoke in excellent form and was the most persuasive of the Harvard speakers. The case of the affirmative he defined in part as follows:-

"In discussing the specific proposition, the affirmative of which Harvard is here to uphold, we wish it understood at the outset that we do not share in the extravagant pretensions popularly set up for arbitration. We do not contend that a permanent court will extinguish the war power. We recognize that international arbitration is suited to a limited class of cases. No nation should or can bind itself to submit to arbitration its own existence or territorial integrity or questions of internal policy involved in insurrection or civil war.

"Nor is the issue as between a permanent court and a temporary court, for we have no system of temporary courts; we have only the chance under the gravest difficulties of getting temporary courts. The issue then is not general arbitration against special arbitration, but a permanent court against the uncertain prospect of a temporary court.

"Now it does not relieve the negative to say that eventually temporary courts have been set up. Eventually the Maine boundary, for over 40 years a source of great irritation between England and the United States, was submitted to arbitration, though finally settled by treaty. Such delay enables the jingoes to seize upon disputes, harmless in themselves, and to magnify them until they have created a veritable war scare with all its moral and material consequences. Further the practice of allowing cases even of minor importance, to drag on unsetted only increases the irritation between the two countries and endangers the peaceful settlement of graver disputes.

"Out of this precarious and dilatory state of affairs flows the need of a permanent system, which has the advantages of having the machinery ready and getting a large number of cases referred to arbitration earlier. This means not only a lessening of the irritation and friction between the two counties, but also a saving of the material loss now produced by the mere apprehension of hostilities."

R. S. Baldwin was evidently considerably upset because Steward had not presented some definite plan, as he spoke in an uncertain tone. He demanded of the affirmative that they produce some definite plan and tell what they considered to be a permanent court. Then he went on to show that permanent courts are impracticable, and that the affirmative was trying to do what statesmen have not been able to do in centuries. The negative, he said, favor arbitration of some kind but it is in the shape of a permanent system such as is prepared by Lord Salisbury. The charge advocated is radical and uncertain, as all plans for a permanent court have been deemed impracticable and impossible. What is the excuse for a permanent court if it is not to prevent war? It is questions of principle which cause war, and they cannot be arbitrated. What recent war, we ask, could have been prevented by arbitration? We have at present, he said, a conspicuously successful system of arbitration. Why should we throw it over for an uncertain one?

The second Harvard speaker, A. M. Sayre, went on to show what constitutes an international court.

"The tribunal which decided the Alabama claims was called a court in the treaty between the contracting powers. What would therefore be a permanent court of arbitration? Simply a court analagous to the familiar temporary bodies, analagous in all respects, except in its duration and jurisdiction. Why these two exceptions? The jurisdiction of the temporary courts was defined by the treaty which created them, the permanent court must have its jurisdiction defined by the teaty creating it. The classes of cases will be carefully marked out,- they will be questions of fact and questions of laws-excluding questions that involve questions of policy. Such a court would include questions of law such as the Alabama dispute.

"We should be especially solicitous for this court, because of our intimate relations with that country. The complexity of our commercial relations with that country. The complexity of our commercial relations causes numerous questions of indemnity to arise between the two countries. They are, therefore, an excellent subject for this court. Because of our intimate relations with England our treaties with her have required more of the time and thought of our State Department than the treaties with all other powers combined. The construction of treaties seems therefore a proper matter for the court. From the contiguity of our territory the settlement of boundary disputes should be arranged for in advance, and provision should be made to adjust that permanent source of international trouble-the fisheries.

"As to the exact composition of the court, that is a matter of detail. We stand here for the principle of a permanent court. Its composition is easy if the principle of its existence is once admitted.

"I have shown that a court with such a jurisdiction and such a composition as I have outlined is a perfectly safe extension of the principle of arbitration. The gentlemen are in favor of the principle of arbitration. They must therefore be in favor of such a permanent court of arbitration unless they can point out specific dangers in the idea of a permanent court, in its jurisdiction or in its composition. Otherwise they stand convicted of refusing to accept the logical result of their own position."

W. H. Clark, the second speaker in the negative, said the first great guarantee in the system proposed by the affirmative is lacking, furthermore, in impartiality in the matter of judges who are to decide the jurisdiction? If the nations themselves, then their scheme is practically the present special system. Who is to decide principles upon which the decision of the court is to be based? Would the decisions of this court be any more likely to be enforced than now? No. We have now an agreement to abide by decisions in particular cases. Under their system we would have a vague agreement to abide by decisions at some future time which statesmen would find easy to lay aside when they desired. Your step is not only unnecessary, it is unsafe.

The third Harvard speaker, W. B. Parker, re-enforced the point that the strength of the court was its limitation.

"Our project is eminently practical; it offers three positive and lasting advantages. The permanent court would have the machinery for settling disputes ready in advance. The second advantage is that the very existence of the court composed of the most eminent jurists of the Anglo-Saxon race and invested with the honor and authority of the two greatest nations of the age must powerfully affect the imagination of the people. Here are two advantages which the negative have not been able to deny. With the permanent court you cannot help getting them; without the court you cannot get them at all.

"Now a third advantage is that a court like this could not fail to have a great and beneficial influence upon international law. Temporary courts are not only by their nature incapable of laying down principles but by varying and uncertain decisions may even multiply causes of dispute, but the permanent court is bound to lay down principles.

"The negative say that we are going too far, that a treaty providing for temporary arbitration as occasion may arise is preferable. We admit the advantages of such a system if you compare it with one present precarious condition, but this debate forces you to compare it with a permanent court.

"There is no well-grounded objection which can be brought against a permanent court which cannot equally be brought against a treaty device. And, more than this, it falls short of the positive advantages which a permanent court must give. It is still a promise against a reality, and so long as it is possible for diplomatists to dodge the meaning of treaties, and so long as they can gain by doing so, such a treaty system must remain obviously inferior to a permanent court. To sum it all up in a word, the way to be sure of a court is to have it, and the only way to have it is to provide it in advance."

A. P. Stokes, the third Yale speaker, said: We would argue as a substitute for their plan the proposition of statesmanship; upon this we rest our hopes of greater peace. We can guarantee absolute impartiality in special cases, while they cannot in a permanent court. Our system is perfectly natural. It has grown up with both nations and has settled all cases which could possibly have been settled by permanent courts. Again, diplomacy is the easiest method of settling dispute. The knowledge of the existence of such a court will take away the sense of responsibility from diplomatists. If the affirmative would vindicate their position they must prove that a court is entirely and absolutely practicable.

The real debate was brought out in rebuttal. Steward made a most forcible and effective outline of the case which had been presented by the affirmative. In marked contrast to Steward's speech was the active rebuttal of Baldwin. Sayre spoke rapidly and with great clearness and earnestness. Clark again pursued his method of answering the affirmative by setting over against each other apparently contrary arguments made by the Harvard speakers. Parker was slow, speaking in rather a hoarse voice, but with force. Stokes lost by a monotonous rising inflection, but had good form, and ended with a strong appeal.

After the debate a banquet was given the speakers at the New Haven House at which Thomas Thatcher, Yale '71, of New York, acted as toastmaster.