The Latest Political Pivot

If Obama’s June announcement—that the United States will begin funneling arms to Syrian rebels in an attempt to help them fight off the armies of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad—says anything, it’s this: Iraq still hangs on America’s mind. A seven-year occupation may be over, but the impact of the war is heavy. Its influence in Obama’s new regional initiative is obvious; its effects hang over the recent NSA scandal and the still-open Guantanamo Bay. Depositing weapons in the hands of the rebels is only the latest in a series of convoluted decisions the government has made in the Middle East since Iraq that reflect the unclear decision-making standard of Bush and Obama.

There are eerie parallels between the Syrian despot of today and the Saddam Hussein regime of 10 years ago. Hussein, a dictator America threw its full support behind in 1987 when the leader was murdering Kurds with chemical weapons in a conflict with Iran, was overthrown by the American military in 2003. Even before he took office, leaked Wikileaks documents showed that Obama had already begun to court al-Assad as a potential ally when al-Assad, who previously declared support for Hezbollah, had not yet renounced support for the Lebanese militant group. In both cases, thousands of deaths were not enough to compel American involvement (93,000 and counting in Syria). The line that could not be crossed were the development of deadly weapons: the alleged weapons of mass destruction of Hussein and the now-disputed (at least by Russia) chemical weapons of Assad.

However, the similarity of the two situations demonstrates a pair of exceptions, not the rule. In fact, finding a rule for foreign policy in the last 10 years has been nearly impossible with the two administrations, which share similarities that are all the more unsettling when contemplating that Obama ran an “anti-Bush” campaign in 2008. Justifying their tactics under the “war on terror” umbrella, the two administrations have provided different reasons for each foray into the Middle East.

The first was democracy. When the military first overthrew Hussein, America attempted to install a Western style democracy in Iraq for the seven years of its occupation. The same interventionist standard fell by the river, however, when it came to repressive monarchies like Saudi Arabia—a nation whose oil trade with the United States proved more important than its style of government. Obama was no more committed to this ideal than Bush was, as the Arab Spring demonstrated. The president sided with Egyptian rebels pushing for democracy but sent funds to a Bahranian government shooting rounds into peaceful democratic protestors.

The second justification was civil rights. Operation Iraqi Freedom, according to President Bush, was about bringing civil liberties to the people of the Middle East and saving terrorized populations from violent despots. Libya, and the overthrow of dictator Muammar Gadaffi, had similar justifications. The policy is implemented intermittently, however; while drug violence caused nearly 16,000 deaths in Mexico last year alone, the government has done little to protect its neighbors. Similarly, when in 2008, 45,000 people a month were dying in the Congo, American forces were nowhere to be found.

It’s important to note that there are few advocates for a consistent interventionist policy. After all, America is not the world’s police and even as its lone superpower, should not feel the obligation to be. However, that doesn’t spare Obama and Bush the onus of justifying their Middle East interventions under a consistent foreign policy. While the United States can’t be everywhere, that phrase is a cop out and not a justification. For two presidents who have presided over Guantanamo Bay and the evolution of drone strikes, expressing concern for civil liberties abroad is not only absurdly hypocritical but also an insufficient justification.

A number of smaller dichotomies further illuminate the contrasts at play in the policies of the two. While Obama has been anti-war, placing non-interventionists John Kerry and Chuck Hagel in key cabinet positions, he is anti-violence, expanding drone policies and issuing a secret memo authorizing the killing of overseas American terrorist suspects. Even as the government criticizes the rest of the Middle East for its repressive policies, mum has been the word on Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip.

With its origins in Iraq, the “war of terror” justification persists today in Syria. For Dan Drezner, the arming of the rebels is a ploy against regional foes Hezbollah and Iran, each of which have supplied weapons and forces to al-Assad’s efforts. This realpolitik, as Drezner describes it, is yet another foreign policy change. By extending the war, even at the cost of human lives, America helps to drain the resources of its enemies in the region, waging a war on terror under the pretense of preserving human rights. With the rebels facing a last stand of sorts—20,000 al-Assad militiamen have been fighting the rebels in Aleppo, the resistance’s main stronghold, since June—Obama’s sudden pivot is less surprising.

As the president, navigating the complex maze of foreign diplomacy is one of the job’s toughest tasks. Not only are commanders-in-chief responsible for the actions of those who came before them, they have the unenviable proposition of being the leader of the world’s only superpower. Both Bush and Obama took this responsibility by leading on a case-by-case basis; the Bush invasion of Iraq sprung the beginnings of a decade of haphazard actions in the Middle East where independent decisions form an less than cohesive foreign policy. Syria is only the latest Mediterranean quandary with an inconsistent resolution, likely not the last.

David P. Freed ’16 is a Crimson sports and editorial writer in Mather House. Follow him on Twitter at @CrimsonDPFreed.